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This study examines the indirect relationship between board structure and firm 
performance with the mediating effect of intellectual capital and cost of capital. In 
addition, the study examines the total, direct and indirect effect of board structure on firm 
performance through intellectual capital and cost of capital using path analysis model. 
Analysis was made from 2010-2019 for a sample of 41 firms comprising of NZX50 index 
listed on New Zealand stock exchange.  
Fixed effect model revealed that only board independence is mediated by 
intellectual capital and the random effect model revealed that board size, CEO duality 
and board background and skill diversity to be negatively mediated by cost of capital and 
board independence, audit committee composition and gender diversity to be positively 
mediated by cost of capital. Finally, the path model provides support for the main 
research objective that the relationship between board structure (except gender diversity) 
and firm performance is mediated by the indirect effect of intellectual capital and cost of 
capital.  
The study provides useful insight to the board and policy makers about the 
importance of enhancing intellectual capital and to the academicians to incorporate 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Overview 
 
With the increase in technological changes, innovation, and sophisticated 
customers’, market competition is shifted towards intellectual capital, i.e., valuable 
intangible capital, and resources. The study of Kamukama et al., (2010) suggested that 
the rapid changes in modern companies are highly dependent on the relational, human, 
and structural capital which are the components of intellectual capital. Such suggestion is 
in line with prior studies (Wang & Chang, 2005; Chen et al., 2005; Kamukama et al., 
2010; Rahman, 2012; Morariu, 2014) that found a significant positive relationship 
between intellectual capital and firm performance. Therefore, whenever intellectual 
capital gets enhanced, firm performance increases. 
There are two separate streams of literature: (1) examining the relationship 
between board structure, intellectual capital, and firm performance (Nkundabanyanga, 
2014; Hamdan et al., 2017)  (2)  examining the relationship between board structure, cost 
of capital, and firm performance (Berger et al., 1997; Asbaugh-Skaife, 2006; Byun, 2007; 
Hajj et al., 2013). This study fills the gap by combining the two-separate streams of 
literature into one using agency theory, resource dependency theory, and resource-based 
view theory. 
This study links board structure, intellectual capital, cost of capital and firm 
performance variables as follows: board of directors is considered as the main driver of 
intellectual capital as they provide the signal to externals about corporate governance 
quality, shareholder’s rights, and help in strategy development and implementation. Thus, 
the board of directors provides a competitive advantage and help to improve the 
intellectual capital of the firm. Also, the board of directors always try to hire directors 
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with unique skills and knowledge that can help to improve intellectual capital efficiency 
(resource dependency theory). Thus, board structure and intellectual capital are related 
(Williams, 2000; Williams, 2003; N-P Swarts & Firer, 2005; Zamani et al., 2012; Al-
Musalli & Ismail, 2012; Appuhami & Bhyan, 2015). Also, when the firm enjoys high 
intellectual capital efficiency, they can use the skills, knowledge, and external 
connections available within the firm to influence capital suppliers (resource-based view 
theory). Thus, an association between intellectual capital and the cost of capital is found 
(Richardson & Welker, 2001; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Boujelbene & Affes, 2013; 
Attig et al., 2013). Finally, the cost at which capital is received by the firms’ influences 
the firm performance, where an association is found between the cost of capital and firm 
performance. Thus, we see an indirect effect of board structure on firm performance 
through intellectual capital and the cost of capital. Therefore, this study aims to 
investigate if intellectual capital and cost of capital mediate the relationship between 
board structure and firm performance. Also, the study tries to help policymakers in New 
Zealand and other OECD countries in the future development of corporate governance 
principles/codes to focus on the importance of enhancing intellectual capital. Therefore, 
the study focuses on the examination of the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance through the mediating effect of intellectual capital and the cost of capital. 
1.2. Background of the study 
With a small economy and less developed capital market compared to the UK and 
US, New Zealand is among one the OECD countries. Ownership concentration is very 
high and large firms have a small market capitalization (Reddy et al., 2015). New 
Zealand has a low degree of financial development, the private capital market, and 
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undeveloped derivative (Capital Market Development Taskforce, 2009). Also, minority 
shareholders experience a low ratio of stock market capitalization. However, the 
regulatory framework (Companies Act 1993) and the judicial system which is based on 
the Anglo-Saxon system of the UK protects the minority shareholders. These 
features/factors show that New Zealand is like an emerging market compared to the US, 
UK, and Australia (Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2014). As a developed economy, New 
Zealand has applied the best practices of corporate governance which is in line with the 
US, Australia, and the UK. 
Issues relating to corporate governance have received major attention since 2000 
when every country tried to improve corporate governance practices. OECD countries 
have faced various scandals, corporate collapses, and frauds such as WorldCom, Tyco 
International, Enron (US), HIH Insurance (Australia), Air New Zealand (NZ), Nortel 
(Canada), etc. These scandals have raised red flags about the ineffective practices of 
corporate governance and the reporting and disclosure of accounting information (Adams, 
2011; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Shen & Chih, 2007). 
Although New Zealand did not experience major collapses such as those reported 
in the USA, UK, and Australia there were concerns highlighted by international and local 
participants regarding the governance practices and poor firm performance (Healy, 2003). 
Air New Zealand and Bank of New Zealand faced some problems due to poor corporate 
governance practices. During 2001, this heightened awareness about corporate governance 
practices forced the regulators in New Zealand to review their practices of corporate 
governance. The focus of regulators in New Zealand was to keep the compliance cost low 
and improve transparency by balancing investor’s needs. In this regard, New Zealand 
adopted a principle-based approach like Canada, the US, and the UK. 
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Corporate governance reform has been through various changes in New Zealand 
starting from securities law and Companies Act 1993 which included both disclosure 
activities and governance. Companies Act 1993 served as the foundation for a corporate 
governance framework for companies providing the director’s duty and rights of 
shareholders. In 2003, due to the corporate governance awareness, New Zealand securities 
commission were asked to develop corporate governance principles. In 2004, nine 
principles were released which were introduced as “Corporate Governances Codes and 
Principles”. These principles included that: (1) executives and directors remuneration must 
be fair, reasonable and transparent (2) independence and quality of external audit quality 
must be ensured (3) directors must have high ethical standards (4) for the effective 
functioning of the board there must be a balance of skills, knowledge among the directors 
(5) interest of stakeholders must be respected (6) integrity of reporting, timeliness, and 
balance of disclosure must be maintained (7) constructive relation with the shareholders 
must be made by the board (8) board should establish a committee to enhance 
effectiveness while retaining its responsibility (9) appropriate process must exist by the 
board to identify and manage risks (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004). New 
Zealand stock exchange specifies that these codes are not mandatory, but companies must 
take full advantage of the code for better governance. Companies reporting corporate 
governance practices as per the New Zealand listing rule must cover all the set principles. 
Any departure/deviation from these principles must be justified to the investors (New 
Zealand Securities Commission, 2004). Thus, the SEC provided an environment where 
firms themselves can define how to define good corporate governance. Unlike, the US act-
based regulation where management is monitored New Zealand’s corporate governance 
practices are not mandatory and there is a tendency of soft regulation. A study found that 
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this soft tendency regulation is effective in New Zealand which reduces managerial 
discretionary accruals (Bhuyian et al., 2013). 
Besides, issuers listed with the New Zealand stock exchange must take into 
consideration Corporate Governance Best Practice Code of New Zealand which focuses 
on four main issues i.e., independent auditors, directors, ethics, and board committee. Like 
the principles code of SEC, the best practice code provides perspective guidance in a more 
detailed manner. The best practice code does not contradict with the principles. As per 
New Zealand’s listing rule, firms should reveal in their annual report the extent to which 
their practices of corporate governance differ from the best practice code with a reasonable 
explanation to the shareholders. 
Corporate Governance Code and Principles were reformed, and the new Corporate 
Governance Code was released in 2017 by the New Zealand stock exchange. The new 
code is more comprehensive reflecting international best practices and is structured in 8 
principles with recommendations under each principle. The additional nine principles, 
(Stakeholder interest) under the 2004 Corporate Governance Code has been folded into the 
eight principles of the new code (Cooney & Goddard, 2017). 
1.3. Research objective 
 
The main aim of this study is to examine the relationship between board structure, 
intellectual capital, cost of capital, and firm performance using path analysis model. More 
specifically, this study examines the (1) indirect relationship between board structure and 
firm performance with the mediating effect of intellectual capital (2) indirect relationship 
between board structure and firm performance with the mediating effect of cost of capital 
(3) direct, indirect and total effect of board structure on firm performance. Additionally, 
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the study aims to achieve six secondary research objectives, to examine the direct 
relationship between: (1) board structure and firm performance (2) board structure and 
intellectual capital (3) board structure and cost of capital (4) intellectual capital and firm 
performance (5) intellectual capital and cost of capital (6) cost of capital and firm 
performance. 
1.4. Research question 
 
Main research question: Do intellectual capital and cost of capital mediate the 
relationship between board structure and firm performance? 
Secondary research questions are: 
Question 1: What is the relationship between board structure and firm performance? 
Question 2: What is the relationship between board structure and intellectual capital? 
Question 3: What is the relationship between board structure and the cost of capital? 
Question 4: What is the relationship between intellectual capital and firm performance? 
Question 5: What is the relationship between intellectual capital and the cost of capital? 
Question 6: What is the relationship between the cost of capital and firm performance? 
1.5. Contribution of the study 
 
On the academic front, this study aims to add value to the corporate governance 
and intellectual capital literature and address the research problem addressed in this 
research. For many decades, the corporate governance area has been researched. 
However, unlike prior studies, this study examines the indirect relationship between 
board structure and firm performance with the mediating effect of intellectual capital and 
the cost of capital. Also, the study examines the total, direct, and indirect effect of board 
structure on firm performance through intellectual capital and cost of capital using the 
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path analysis model. A review of prior literature revealed that the direct relation between 
board structure and firm performance is examined without any mediating variables or in 
some cases with either only intellectual capital or cost of capital as mediating variables. 
This study fills the gap by combining two separate streams of literature by studying board 
structure, intellectual capital, cost of capital, and firm performance variables in one 
model. This shows a sign of mature discipline to incorporate mediating variables in 
examining relationships for a meaningful conclusion. A relational study without a 
mediating mechanism ends with facts and incomplete understanding. Therefore, the 
incorporation of mediating variables should not be underestimated if more explanation 
for an outcome is required. 
From a managerial perspective, in the 21st century all firms try to improve their 
performance by various means such as increased sales, marketing, seeking consultation 
services, etc. This may also include the efficient utilization of intellectual capital and 
resources by the firms’ to maintain a competitive advantage. However, understanding the 
effective variables and controlling mechanisms of corporate governance helps in easy 
achievement of better performance. The result of this study can be used as a guideline by 
the management and board to know on what aspect of board structure to focus. This will 
help them to enhance intellectual capital that can reduce the cost of capital and improve 
firm performance. Although the board is emphasized by the Companies Act and the best 
corporate governance code and principles, managers and directors must keep in mind that 
board structure is not separate from intellectual capital. Intellectual capital can be 
transformed from knowledge to value (Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996). Board of directors 
must aim to enhance intellectual capital as it will help to get finance at a cheaper rate 
improving performance. Thus, the board of directors’ drive firm in the right direction and 
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improve firm performance benefiting major stakeholders. 
Finally, from the practical implication perspective, this study findings can help 
policymakers and the stock market to decide on how to set corporate governance 
principles or codes that can help firms to enhance firm performance focusing on 
intellectual capital. Especially, in New Zealand where ownership concentration is very 
high and market capitalization low, it becomes difficult for intellectual capital to be 
utilized or managed efficiently and effectively due to the owners’ influence and control 
over management. Since the finding of the results showed intellectual capital mediates 
positively between board structure and firm performance and lowers the cost of capital, the 
study guides practitioners in New Zealand on developing principles/codes on the 
importance of intellectual capital and encouraging dispersed ownership. 
1.6. Thesis structure 
 
This study includes the below chapters: 
Chapter 1:  Illustrates a brief overview of the study, background information about 
corporate governance in New Zealand, research problem, contributions, objectives, and 
research question 
Chapter 2: Provides intensive literature review relating to board structure, intellectual 
capital and firm performance and board structure, cost of capital, and firm performance. 
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework is provided in light of agency theory, resource 
dependency theory, and resource-based view theory. Also, the hypothesis is developed 
depending on the theory and conclusion of the literature review.  
Chapter 4: Methodology section details the research design, sample, variables used, and 
measurement. 
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Chapter 5: Normality test, path analysis model and estimation, descriptive statistic, 
correlation, and robustness check is explained. 
Chapter 6: Highlight of the statistical results, conclusion, and limitation of the study with 
future research prospects are provided. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter aims to provide a prior review of studies regarding board structure, 
intellectual capital, cost of capital, and firm performance. This chapter is divided into 
three sections. The first section provides an overview of board structure and intellectual 
capital. The second section provides a review of studies based on board structure, 
intellectual capital, and firm performance. The last section provides a review of studies 
based on board structure, cost of capital, and firm performance. This study focuses on 
seven proxies of board structure i.e., board size, board independence, CEO duality, audit 
committee, gender diversity, board background and skill diversity, and board meeting. 
2.1. Overview 
2.1.1. Board structure 
Having an appropriate and skilled board is an important requirement for the 
ongoing operation of the organization which defines good corporate governance. 
Corporate governance is of interest to large groups of people such as policymakers, 
shareholders, and regulators who want transparency in the practices and functions of 
board as well as the effectiveness and accountability of directors. Board is responsible for 
the return of investment and protecting shareholders’ interest. Board must be flexible and 
ready to tackle any issue faced such as cybersecurity, social responsibility, diversity, or 
technology. To achieve the goal, the right board structure must be set up that complies 
with the rules and regulation and at the same time help in generating value (Richard, 




Two main models of board structure are the one-tier model and two-tier model 
(Klaus, 1998) which have been the debate in corporate governance regarding good 
governance. The one-tier model has been the prevailing model in New Zealand, the US, 
UK, Portugal, Spain, and Italy (Klaus, 1998). Two main functions are performed by the 
board under this board structure i.e., defining strategy of the company and monitoring 
management. Under this model, decisions are made jointly by the executive and non-
executive directors (French, Mayson & Ryan, 2009). Corporate governance analyst has 
also reached out to the best practices for board of directors under the one-tier model. 
These practices include (Davies, Hansmann & Hopt, 2004) (1) use of the board 
committee (2) majority board member should be non-executive (3) optimal board size 
should not be more than 10 members, etc. Under this model, one of the disadvantages is 
that the non-executive directors’ independence might be impacted due to the loyalty of 
colleagues. 
A significant trend of board composition under the one-tier model is the 
increasing proportion or number of independent directors. According to Tricker (2009), 
an independent director is a non-management member free from any professional relation 
or family relation with the company. Under the continental model with concentrated 
ownership, independent directors try to solve the agency problem between minority-
majority shareholders. At the expense of minority shareholders, controlling shareholders 
might enrich themselves where they can disclose less information or take decisions for 
their benefit (Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010). Thus, independent directors monitor the 
company in such a way that the interest of shareholders and the company as a separate 
legal entity coincides. On the other hand, under the Anglo-Saxon model with dispersed 
ownership, independent directors behave like a proxy of shareholders to monitor if the 
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firm acts in the shareholders’ interest or not. This is because there is no personal or 
financial interest in keeping the management by these directors. Numerous best practice 
codes around the world recommend that effective monitoring by independent directors 
must be made available on the board (Lynne, 2003). 
The second model of board structure is the two-tier model which is seen in 
Germany, Netherland, Austria, and Switzerland. It is mandatory to have two board i.e., 
management and supervisory board. Daily management is controlled by the management 
board whereas the supervisory board advises, nominates, dismisses, and controls the 
management board (Aste, 1999). Also, it is quite common to see on the supervisory board 
in Germany, Slovakia, and Austria representation of employees but is absent in Poland 
and Estonia (Rudolf, 2008). Independency of the supervisory board is one of the benefits 
of the two-tier model where outside directors always exist. However, the supervisory 
board may not have supervision in case the information flow from the management board 
is inappropriate or too slow. 
Board structure can be examined from different dimensions such as board size, 
board diversity, number of independent directors, CEO duality, etc. Institutional investors 
and interest groups have pressurized firms to have a diversity of directors in terms of 
ethnicity, gender, and expertise. In this respect, companies are required to structure their 
board in a way that serves their need (Grady, 1999). Board composition may vary 
depending on various factors such as operating environment, governance, and ownership 
structure (Van der Walt et al., 2002). For instance, Raheja (2005) suggests that board size 
be small whenever the shareholders’ and insiders’ interest is aligned. This is because 
there will be less need of a non-executive director to monitor, thus reducing board 
independence. Similarly, Raheja (2005) suggests more non-executive directors are 
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necessary when the influence and bargaining power of the CEO is high. Thus, depending 
on various factors firms structure their board in a way that is consistent with the benefit 
and cost of advising and monitoring the board (Linck, Netter & Yang, 2007). 
2.1.2. Intellectual capital 
 Atalay (2018) proposes that intellectual capital is viewed as information that can 
be changed into value. John Kenneth Galbraith was the first person to mention the 
intellectual capital concept in his statement when he wrote a letter to Michael Kalecki in 
1969. John Kenneth viewed intellectual capital from an individual perspective while Tom 
Stewart made the concept famous for firms in his article “Brainpower: How intellectual 
capital is becoming America’s valuable asset” published in 1991 in the Fortune Magazine 
(Kalkan et al., 2014). Intellectual capital includes key characteristics such as (1) it plays a 
key role in achieving competitive advantage (2) it is an intangible asset which cannot be 
retrieved from the balance sheet (3) increase/decrease in intellectual capital is regarded as 
the intellectual performance which can be measured and observed. 
Intellectual capital does not have a specific definition as it has emerged from 
different academic disciplines. Some of these definitions include; intellectual capital that 
establishes a resource-based for firms (Bontis, 1996); the difference between market and 
book value (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997); total intangible resources held by a firm that 
provides a competitive advantage as well as future benefits (Andriesson, 2004); effective 
use of knowledge against information (Bontis, 1998); assets of an organization that are 
hidden (trademark, patents) or assets that are not included in the financial statement 
(Roos & Roos, 1997); knowledge that is shared by everyone in the organization and that 
adds value to the organization (Cantu et al., 2009). 
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The specific classification of intellectual capital elements has not been reached in 
the literature. Authors have classified intellectual capital elements differently; human, 
customer and structural (Bontis et al., 2000; Bontis, 1998); human, customer and 
relational capital and organizational (Roos & Roos, 1997), competency of the employee, 
internal/external structure (Sveiby, 1997). Three elements of Sveiby (1997) were adopted 
by Edvinsson & Malone (1997) and renamed as the human, customer, and organizational 
capital. Later, Pablos (2003) renamed customer capital as relational capital. Therefore, 
there is a partial agreement reached in the literature that intellectual capital includes three 
components namely, human, structural, and relational capital (Edvinsson & Malone, 
1997; Mouritsen, 1998; Sveiby, 1998; Tayles et al, 2007). 
The main source of competitive advantage and the main element of intellectual 
capital is human capital which includes individual experience, value, skill, and education 
(Bontis, 1998). It is suggested that human capital is improved by the organizational 
practices of education and training (Keenan & Aggestam, 2001). Due to the competence 
of employees, there will be a positive impact on the firm leading to productivity, work 
performance, and customer loyalty (Dave, 1998). According to Gulcemal (2016), human 
capital is a source of innovation and change for an organization that can be developed and 
improved continuously by the learning and education of employees. Similarly, Turkoglu 
(2016), indicated that human capital is the accumulation of information that people bring 
and take when they join and leave work. The second element of intellectual capital is 
structural capital, also known as organizational capital, which supports human capital 
(Mouritsen et al., 2001; Kalkan et al., 2014). In other words, structural capital is a 
supportive infrastructure for human capital that provides an environment where 
employees are motivated to create knowledge by investing in human capital (Shih et al., 
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2010). Bontis (1998) argued that if firms want to achieve a goal, human capital cannot be 
isolated from structural capital. This is because even if the employees had the expertise 
and the firm had poor system and procedure, intellectual capital will not be reached to its 
full benefit. Structural capital deals with organizations’ procedures, infrastructure, 
structure, and processes that include innovative capital such as trademark, patent, 
copyright, culture, and hardware/software system (Tayles et al., 2007). Structural capital 
can be traded and owned by the firm which can be legally protected unlike human capital 
(Edvinsson & Malone, 1997). Finally, the third component of intellectual capital is 
relational capital also known as capital employed (connection of firm with the external 
environment). It includes relationships with the market, suppliers, industrial networks, 
banks, and government (Tayles et al, 2007). Relational capital must be created and 
maintained by the organization as it can be used in the future to get help for the 
appropriate operation of the firm (Mention, 2012). A strong link between human and 
relational capital exists because it is the firms’ employees who creates and maintains the 
relationship with externals. This significantly contributes to the firm performance 
(Welbourne, 2008). According to Giuliani (2013), individual intellectual capital elements 
are not enough for a successful organization, where all elements must be combined to 
create value.  
According to Zerenler & Gozlu (2008), within an economy of knowledge-based, 
intellectual capital is viewed as a strategic resource. Intellectual capital by the exchange 
and creation of new knowledge, adds value to the firm, and improves the efficiency of 
both labor and capital market (Petty & Guthrie, 2000). A study showed that intellectual 
capital positively impacts the wealth and performance of the organization (Zerenler & 
Gozlu, 2008). However, firms’ face the problem of managing and controlling the 
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elements of intellectual capital within the organization. Van der Meer-Kooistra & Zijlstra 
(2000) argued that if intellectual capital is not created, maintained, and controlled it will 
not add any value to the organization and will be useless. Thus, various studies have 
argued corporate governance plays an important role to protect, maintain, and retain 
intellectual capital within the organization (Keenan & Aggestam, 2001; Safieddine et al., 
2009). The presence of appropriate and good corporate governance attracts and increases 
intellectual capital within the organization. This ensure appropriate decisions are made to 
enhance shareholder’s value using intellectual capital (Safieddine et al., 2009). 
2.2. Board structure, intellectual capital, and firm performance   
Prior research studying the relationship between all the three variables i.e., board 
structure, intellectual capital and firm performance (Nkundabanyanga, 2014; Hamdan et 
al., 2017) is less compared to the research made on examining the relationship between 
two variables separately i.e., board structure and intellectual capital (Williams, 2000; 
Williams, 2003; N-P Swarts & Firer, 2005; Zamani et al., 2012; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 
2012; Appuhami & Bhyan, 2015) and intellectual capital and firm performance (Wang & 
Chang, 2005; Chen et al., 2005; Kamukama et al., 2010; Rahman, 2012; Morariu, 2014).  
Various studies have studied the relationship between attributes of the board 
(CEO duality, board size, independence, board committee) and firm performance. A 
meta-analytic study by Garcia-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta (2009) examining corporate 
governance and earnings management suggested that audit committee independence, 
board size and independence constraints the earnings of management thereby improve 
investors’ confidence. Similarly, it is argued that the corporate governance scandal is 
very costly for which it must be controlled (Knapp et al., 2011). However, the control 
17  
approach to governance does not improve firm performance directly. Kula (2005) found 
firm performance is positively related whenever the board acquires resources. 
Consistently, Okpara (2011) argues that an effective board is significantly related to 
performance in developing countries. Thus, a good composition or governance of the 
board influences firm performance. Mishra & Mohanty (2014) argues that investors 
prefer to deal with companies that have a good board governance practice. Similarly, 
Agrawal et al. (1996) argue that funds at lower cost can be obtained with good board 
governance, that can positively impact firm performance (Mishra & Mohanty, 2014). 
Board governance establishes the rules for creating, sharing value, establishes 
relationships with employees, and provides guidelines on how to control and manage 
resources (Safieddine et al., 2009). Firms control resources such as information and 
knowledge, assets organizational processes, and firm attributes. These resources provide 
a competitive advantage when they are rare, non-substitutable, and valuable (Barney, 
1991). These resources are collectively called intellectual capital. Sullivan (2000) argues 
that an appropriate board will be able to identify the content of intellectual capital within 
its firm. According to Keenam & Aggestam (2001), managerial decision making 
improves the value of shareholders by capital while corporate governance uses 
intellectual capital to leverage and create value. If the board does not focus on intellectual 
capital it would be a failure of board governance that can affect firm performance.  
According to the traditional approach, company’s employees create and enhance 
intellectual capital (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997). However, Berezinets et al. (2016) 
argued that apart from company’s employees various other parties like suppliers, 
stakeholders, governing bodies contribute to intellectual capital. However, the main 
contributors of intellectual capital are members of the board. Directors have intellectual 
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capital (skills, knowledge, expertise) which helps to monitor management and at the same 
time contribute to increase intellectual capital, thereby improve firm performance 
(Hillman, 2005). 
Main function of the board of directors is the development and implementation of 
company strategy. They participate in the strategic planning process and active leadership 
to develop goals and objectives. A well-designed board structure shapes the firm’s 
leadership leading to a well-performing team that can help to improve firm performance. 
The board of director is the main governing body that provides direction to the company 
through its activities, meetings, and communication (Nkundabanyanga, 2013). However, 
the board of directors are the main contributors for intellectual capital for two reasons: (1) 
since the board of directors are internal governance mechanism, they provide the signal to 
externals regarding corporate governance quality, shareholder’s rights, etc. which impacts 
performance and attracts investment., (2) because the board of director’s function is 
strategy development and implementation, they provide competitive advantage which 
improves intellectual capital. Thus, the board of directors is considered as the main driver 
of intellectual capital, and therefore, this study links board structure and intellectual 
capital.  
Nkundabanyanga (2016) conducted a study of the combined effect of intellectual 
capital and board governance on firm performance using various theories (resource-
based, resource-dependency, and agency theory). With a sample of 128 service firms, it 
was found that board structure (effective communication, board activity, control, and 
meetings) and intellectual capital positively impacted firm performance. A positive 
impact on performance was seen with the interaction of intellectual capital and board 
structure. Similarly, Nkundabanyanga et al. (2014) examined the association between 
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board structure and performance with the mediating effect of intellectual capital. It was 
found that intellectual capital mediates the relationship and act as a conduit. Similarly, in 
KSA, Hamdan et al. (2017) found a similar result, who examined firm performance 
relation with intellectual capital and corporate governance as a mediating variable.  
Literature has provided inconsistent results in examining the relationship between 
board structure and intellectual capital. N-P. Swartz & Firer (2005) examined the 
relationship between South African listed firms. They used stakeholder-agency theory 
arguing that stakeholders can enhance control over managements action. Using the VAIC 
model and two characteristics of board i.e., gender and ethnic diversity, they found a 
significant positive association between ethnic diversity and intellectual capital. In the 
Australian context, more attributes of the board were used; CEO duality, board size, 
subcommittee, and board composition to examine the relationship with intellectual capital 
(Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). They used agency theory enforcing that managerial 
decision-making can leverage and create value for shareholders. Value creation is not 
only depended on how financial and physical capital is used by the managers but also on 
how they manage organizational intellectual capital. Also, it is depended on how 
managers develop practices to efficiently use intellectual capital and motivate 
organizational behavior in achieving goals. Using multiple regression analysis, they 
found CEO duality, remuneration committee composition, and board composition 
positively related to VAIC and no relation found with board size and audit committee. 
The study of Zamani et al. (2012) in Tehran, Williams (2000) in South Africa was in line 
with Appuhami & Bhuyan (2015) where CEO duality resulted in positive relation with 
intellectual capital. In contrary to these studies, Williams (2003) found no relationship 
between VAIC and independent directors, CEO duality, and board size in the context of 
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Sweden, UK, and South African firms. Similarly, in the context of GCC, Al-Musalli & 
Ismail (2012) used resource-dependency theory and did not find any association between 
intellectual capital and board size, nationality, and educational level diversity. Indeed, 
they found a significant negative association between VAIC and non-executive directors. 
However, this study focuses on seven characteristics of board structure i.e., board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, audit committee, gender diversity, board background 
and skill diversity, and board meeting. These proxies of board structure are selected as 
they are considered the main measures for board structure as verified by literature. 
Besides, to provide a structural connection between board structure with intellectual 
capital, cost of capital and firm performance, these characteristics of board structure have 
been used to prove that good corporate governance with a good board structure can 
influence the intellectual capital efficiency. Prior literature of these board characteristics 
relationship with firm performance incorporating the effect of intellectual capital are 
examined below: 
Board size: The number of members on the board of directors is referred to as 
board size. Studies suggested that the main component to define good corporate 
governance is the number of members on the board (Jensen, 1993; Lorsch & Lipton, 
1992). However, it is not easy to examine for each company the right number of directors 
on the board. Linck, Netter & Yang (2007) argued that companies should consider the 
skills of directors along with the skill required. Also, the best size depends on the nature 
and situation of the firm. However, literature argued that an effective board should 
comprise less than eight members (Jensen, 1993), while others argued that the maximum 
should be 10 but is more appropriate to have members between eight and nine (Lorsch & 
Lipton, 1992). Supporting small boards, communication gets better (Ozkan, 2011); faster 
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decisions can be made (Lorsch & Liption, 1992) and coordination gets easier (Hudaib & 
Haniffa, 2006). On the other hand, supporting large board, more time, experience (Uadiale, 
2010) and division of work can exist with the directors which can improve monitoring role 
(Reddy et al, 2010). 
 As per the New Zealand requirement, there should be at least three directors on 
board. In New Zealand, the size of the board has reduced from 7.5 in 1985 to 6.23 in 
2010 (Fox et al., 2013; Bhuiyan et al., 2013). With a decrease in directors, the board has 
less access to expertise compromising firm performance. Also, Bhuiyan & Roudaki 
(2013) argue with the presence of board interlocking, firms in New Zealand suffer to find 
a suitable independent expert director. 
Empirical findings have been inconsistent about board size. In the context of the 
UK, Malaysia, and USA negative associations exist between firm performance and size 
of the board (Donnelly & Kelly, 2005; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005). This indicated that large 
boards are not effective in monitoring and controlling management. Thus, organizations 
are not using intellectual capital efficiently and making less investment in intellectual 
capital. Similarly, in North America and Western Europe (De Andres et al., 2005) 
negative relation was found by examining 450 samples of non-financial companies. 
Supporting prior studies,  Bharathi (2019) also found using panel regression analysis that 
intellectual capital performance decline with larger board size for Indian firms listed on 
National stock exchange. A possible explanation was given that despite larger boards 
having varied skills and knowledge they focus more on financial performance, unlike 
smaller boards who take decisions regarding intellectual capital policy more efficiently. 
On the other hand, in New Zealand, board size did not affect firm performance (Reddy et 
al., 2010). Also, Pi & Timme, (1993); Belkhir, (2006); and Connelly & Limpaphyom, 
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(2004); did not find an association between the size of the board and firm performance. 
Coles et al. (2007) argued firm type is one of the factors which can be considered to 
decide the size of the board. A positive relation was found for complex firms and 
negative relations for single-product firms. Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker (1994) 
examined board size from a different angle compared to the study of Coles et al. (2007). 
They viewed board size from the perspective of strategic-decision making and resource 
dependency theory. Results showed that large board size is effective only from the view 
of resource-dependency theory. Thus, they concluded that firms having a small board are 
more productive. 
Jackling & Johl (2009) examined Indian companies and found a large number of 
board members increase firm performance. This may be due to the expertise and skills 
directors bring with them that positively affect the performance of the organization and 
make an effective investment in intellectual capital. Supporters of large boards argued 
that whenever the monitoring mechanism gets enhanced the ability of the CEO to 
dominate board decreases (Zahra, 1989). Singh & Harianto (1989) supported the 
argument of Zahra (1989) where they argued that the unification of ideas of an important 
decision by the CEO becomes difficult. Thus, shareholders’ value will be increased 
efficiently and effectively. Supporters of the large board also argued based on resource-
dependency theory that it allows firms to have a greater pool of expertise that helps in 
growth (Zahra, 1989; Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
Board independence: Proportion/number of independent directors on board is 
referred to as board independence. According to Tricker (2009), an independent director 
is a non-management member free from any professional relation or family relation with 
the company. Independent directors provide contacts, prestige, and expertise needed by 
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the managers to make decisions regarding intellectual capital (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Also, non-executive directors play a wide range of roles that help in the execution of 
firms’ strategy affecting firm performance (Kroll et al., 2007). 
 Mixed results about the proportion/number of independent directors on board are 
found in the literature. Studying 348 Australian firms, Kiel & Nicholson (2003) found a 
negative association between independent directors and Tobin-q. Similarly, 321 US firms 
studied by Barhart & Rosenstein (1998) showed non-executive directors are weakly 
positively related to performance. Supporting the study of Kiel & Nicholson (2003) and 
Barhart & Rosenstein (1998), Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) also found negative relation 
arguing that independent directors in the board may represent politicians or 
environmental activists due to which they do not add value to the firm. 
 In contrast, using panel data regression Haslindar & Fazilah (2011) found no 
association between the independence of the board and Tobin-q, ROE and ROA for 
Malaysian listed companies from 1999 to 2005. Consistently, Hermalin & Weisbach 
(2003) found no relationship arguing that there is an optimal weight between the 
dependent and independent directors. In the Australian market, no relation was found 
between performance and non-executive directors arguing that those directors do not 
have enough expertise (Lawrence & Stapledon, 1999). Thus, inside directors have the 
knowledge which affects firm performance positively. 
Compared to the above studies, Dey (2008) found a positive association between 
ROA and independence of the board. The study of Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) showed a 
positive excess return with the announcement by the firm in appointing an independent 
director. Consistent with the study of Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990), intellectual capital and 
independent directors showed a positive relation under the study of Ho & Williams 
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(2003) using a sample of 94 Swedish firms. Similarly, in China, independent directors 
helped to reduce the usage of firms’ resources for personal use by increasing investment 
efficiency and inter-company loans (Liu et al., 2015). Also, the study of Duchin et al. 
(2010) showed there was a reduction of management earning by independent directors 
that positively affected firm value. Wan & Ong (2005) supports all the above studies 
(Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Ho & Williams, 2003; Liu et al., 2015; Duchin et al; 2010) 
by arguing that independent directors prefer to show to the board that they are performing 
well so they more conducive towards the goal, mission, and strategy of the organization. 
Wan & Ong (2005) also argued that independent directors come with a different 
background from different organizations bringing more knowledge and skill compared to 
the inside directors who are vested only within their working place. Thus, Wan & Ong 
(2005) argued the presence of independent directors enhances intellectual capital. 
In New Zealand, small-medium sized firms dominate the market where there is 
only a small pool of directors. Directors serve on different boards due to the lack of 
director’s availability. Keown (2009) highlighted that some directors at the same time are 
involved in four to ten different boards. However, according to listing rule 3.3.1 of New 
Zealand, a minimum of two directors must be independent and if eight or more directors 
exist then one-third of directors must be independent. Consistent with this listing rule, 
independent directors in New Zealand positively impacted Tobin Q (Hossain et al., 2001; 
Reddy et al., 2010). Hossain et al. (2001) examined the Companies 1993 Act’s effect on 
performance and board composition. It was found that the outside board representation 
increased significantly with the introduction of the Act. Examining the effect from 2004 
to 2006 Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad (2012) found firm value in New Zealand decreases 
with the presence of independent directors on the board.  
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CEO duality: CEO duality takes place when a person is the board chairman and at 
the same time holds CEO position (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). CEO duality has great 
power which affects board independence. CEO as chairperson can take decisions and 
control board and meetings for personal interest (Boivie et al., 2011). Thus, 
organizational resources gets diverted for personal interest where no investment is made 
in intellectual capital and shareholder’s value does not get enhanced. CEO duality in New 
Zealand dropped from 11.4 percent in 1984 to less than 1 percent in 2010 (Fox et al., 
2013; Bhuiyan et al., 2013). 
Supporters of CEO duality argue that non-duality creates competition between 
CEO and chairman, creates confusion, limits innovation, and creates a lack of effective 
leadership (Andersen et al., 2004). In contrast, opponents argue that CEO duality affects 
board independence that prevents monitoring and performing effective governance (Fama 
et al, 1983). 
Empirical studies have shown mixed results between firm performance and CEO 
duality. In Australia with a sample of 799 firms, CEO duality negatively affected the 
board functioning (Bliss, 2011). Consistently, analyzing 146 firms, Rechner & Dalton 
(1991) found independent CEO outperformed CEO duality structure. Contrary to the 
above studies, Elsayed (2007) analyzed 361 firms and found CEO duality positively 
affected firm performance whenever there is low performance. Similarly, Appuhami & 
Bhuyan (2015) found a positive relation between CEO and intellectual capital showing 
the efficient use of intellectual capital by the firm. Power concentration motivates a 
person to increase firm value through intellectual capital. 
 Vafeas & Theodorou (1998) found CEO duality has no association with 
performance as it depends on the personal characteristics of the person. Vafeas & 
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Theordorou’s (1998) study is supported by Kesner (1988), Chen et al. (2008) & Iyengar 
& Zampelli (2009). Chen et al. (2008) showed that leadership structure changes do not 
affect performance. Similarly, Iyengar & Zampelli (2009) argued CEO duality only 
optimizes performance and found no association between CEO duality and performance. 
Audit committee: Listing rules and governance code of New Zealand, requires 
issuers on the stock exchange to have an audit committee with minimum three directors, 
where majority should be independent and at least one with accounting/finance 
background (New Zealand Corporate Governance, 2019). The independent subcommittee 
improves the functioning and internal control process of the organization (Jing et al., 
2008). In this light, the existence of an independent subcommittee can make sure 
organizational resources (intellectual capital) are used efficiently by the insiders, and 
investment in intellectual capital is made that can enhance shareholder’s value (Keenan & 
Aggestam, 2001). 
There have been a growing number of studies focusing on the association between 
performance and audit committee. A study of 200 fortune companies by Chan & Li 
(2008) found firm value increased with the presence of non-executive directors in the 
audit committee. Similarly, a positive association between performance and audit 
committee was found for Indian companies Saibaba & Ansari (2013). 63% of 142 UK-
based large companies have independent directors in the audit committee to minimize 
information asymmetry (Collier, 2001). To summarize, the presence of a subcommittee 
with independent directors improves the effectiveness of the control process, thereby 
increases the efficiency of intellectual capital. Also, helps organizations to invest in 
intellectual capital. Studies showed that the audit committee has no relation or influence 
on intellectual capital. In Australia, Appuhami & Bhuyan (2015) found no relation 
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arguing that members in the audit committee may not be independent or there is a failure 
in applying appropriate governance in the organization by the directors due to conflicting 
roles of control and management (Ezzamel & Watson, 1997). 
Gender diversity: There is an increasing proportion/number of females on board 
and growing literature examining their impact on firm performance. Graves & Powell 
(1988) found female directors more concerned than male directors in the firm’s 
responsibility towards the community. Female directors incorporate community issues 
within the organization’s development and growth, thus, broaden the scope of the board 
in the decision-making process. Relational capital is one of the components of intellectual 
capital i.e., connection with the external environment where female directors invest 
efficiently in intellectual capital compared to male directors. Also, the presence of 
females on board enforces firms to look for more talented employees within the labor 
market because females can attract and communicate with larger employees increasing 
competitive abilities within the firm (Graves & Powell, 1988). Wiersema & Bantel 
(1992) argues the presence of female increases performance, provides innovation and 
generation of ideas that help in strategic change. Thus, females on board efficiently invest 
in intellectual capital and improve overall firm performance. According to Hambrick 
(2007), females have different cognitive frames compared to men, for instance, 
information seeking and information evaluation process which enhances firm 
performance. 
The relationship between female presence on board and firm performance have 
shown mixed findings in prior literature. Studies by Kesner (1988), Provan (1980), and 
Mitchell Williams (2000) have shown a positive impact of intellectual capital 
performance with the female presence on board. With the data of 47 countries and 
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examining European firms’ consistent results were found (Terjesen et al.,2015; 
Christiansen et al., 2016). Zahoor (2016) measured performance using accounting and 
market-based measures and found gender diversity positively influences firm 
performance. Similarly, Williams (2003) examined the relationship between charitable 
activities and gender diversity. He found that board with a higher proportion of women 
involve more in charitable activity compared to board with a high proportion of men. 
Thus, women on board invest in intellectual capital i.e., relational capital enhancing firm 
performance. 
Effectiveness and efficiency of gender diversity in New Zealand were examined 
from 2005-2015 by Duppati et al. (2017) where it was found that gender diversity does 
not affect performance. Bilimoria & Piderit (1994) argue that because of the small 
number of females on board no relation exists between performance and gender diversity. 
Besides, examining the ownership effect on performance in New Zealand, Fauzi and 
Locke (2012) also concluded that gender diversity on board had a low impact. Finally, 
Kagzi & Guha (2018), studied the linear relationship between board demographic 
diversity and firm performance for Indian firms. They found gender diversity had no 
significant association with TOBINQ similar to the study of Duppati et al. (2017). They 
concluded that one possible explanation would be because of fewer females on board 
they do not have the power to influence decisions. Only 4.6% of the females sit on the 
board compared to 36% of females who are employed in the firm. 
Board background and skill diversity: Varying degree of knowledge and skills 
among board members is reflected by their educational level. This influences the capacity 
of the board to either take a high- or low-quality creative solution to solve problems and 
provide the scope of inputs for long-term success (Ruigrok et al., 2006). The educational 
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level signals the board members’ skills and knowledge. Accumulation of knowledge 
helps board members to learn and develop problem-solving skills more effectively 
(Dahlin et al., 2005). Individual board members may not have all the knowledge and skill 
but as a group (board) they can gather connection, effort, and perspectives. Wincent et al. 
(2010) argue high-level board skills tend to be more flexible, have better ability to accept 
innovation, and adopt new ideas and have greater capabilities to process information. 
These characteristics of board members help them to create policies and strategies on 
how to best use, obtain, and enhance intellectual capital resources. 
Board members with higher qualifications, skills, and industry knowledge ensure 
the board to be more productive in terms of high integrity level, judgment, experience, 
and intellectual ability (Hilmer, 1998). They provide a combination of competencies and 
capabilities for the firm that help to make decisions from different perspectives (Carver, 
2002). A qualified board member provides a knowledge base environment that can 
enhance the thought to solve problems and provide innovative ideas to develop policies. 
From an agency theory perspective, high qualified boards are more effective in 
monitoring which reduces agency cost. From the resource dependency theory 
perspective, high qualified boards act as a strategic resource for the firm that provides a 
strategic connection with the external environment (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001). 
With an inappropriate educational level of directors, firms may not be successful 
and may collapse (Argenti, 1976). For instance, engineers dominating the Rolls-Royce 
board drove the company downwards (Argenti, 1976). Therefore, the varying level of 
background and skill diversity of board members is an important factor for the success of 
a firm. Similarly, Bantel (1993) whose study was based on the financial industry found 
board members with different educational levels helped the firm to make an effective and 
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better decision in the long run. He added a qualified board makes a faster and in-depth 
assessment of decisions reducing the information asymmetry between board and 
management. The positive impact of industry-specific knowledge on firm performance 
was found in the study of Mahadeo et al. (2012). Similarly, the university degree of board 
chairman was associated positively with seven performance measures (change in earning 
per share, MBV ratio, abnormal return, change in return on asset, cumulative return, 
return on asset and earning per share) (Cheng et al., 2010). Supporting the above 
arguments, Darmadi (2013) studied the effect of board member skills and education on 
160 Indonesian firms’ performance. He used four proxies of board skills and knowledge 
namely, postgraduate degree, a degree from a developed country, a degree in financial 
discipline and a degree from a prestigious university. Using Tobin-Q and ROA as firm 
performance, he found that board members with a postgraduate degree and degree from a 
prestigious university to be positively associated with ROA. Similarly, Girbina et al. 
(2012), examined listed firms on Bucharest stock exchange and positive relation was 
found between Tobin-Q and board members with higher financial education and board 
members with a postgraduate degree in the financial field. 
Studies have also found an insignificant relation between firm performance and 
background diversity skills (Murray, 1989). Murray (1989) found that even though 
improvement in communication skills is needed to improve firms’ profit and growth, 
there is an indirect effect on performance. On the contrary, a negative relationship 
between performance and board educational level was found (Bathula, 2008; 
Molenkamp, 2015). Molenkamp (2015) examined 95 listed firms on the Euronext of 
Amsterdam and found no association between educational, nationality diversity, and 
performance. In New Zealand, Bathula (2008), examined board characteristics impact on 
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performance. He found a negative association between performance and educational 
level, board meeting, and positive relation between CEO duality, size of the board, and 
female directors. Therefore, we say that board members’ skills, knowledge and 
educational level affects the intellectual capital of a firm. 
Board meeting:  Firms that conduct regular board meetings are in a better 
position to manage themselves during the tough time. Managers can take effective 
decisions as they get supported by the board meeting where problems are understood and 
discussed in a better way (Mangena & Tauringana, 2008).  
Board meetings and performance have shown a mixed association in literature. In 
Europe, businesses run by the family showed positive relations (Garcia-Ramos, 2011) 
while in India no relationship was found (Jackling & Johl, 2009). When the board 
conducts many meeting they perform better (Ntiem & Osei, 2011) and experience higher 
firm performance. In Spain, listed firms showed a negative relationship (Rodriguez-
Fernandez, 2014). Supporting prior studies, Brick & Chidambaran (2010) added that 
board meeting shows its effect in the next year and that is why the negative association is 
seen in the current year. Also, Ilaboya and Obaretin (2015), added negative association 
maybe because the board diverts firms’ energy and time into activities that are not 
productive which negatively affects performance. 
Simon et al. (1999) argued that a board meeting can overcome board 
communication and coordination problems. Board meetings help to develop intellectual 
capital because it provides counseling to management and provides extensive strategic 
advice. Thus, firms are in a better position to formulate policies and strategies to get 
resources related to intellectual capital (Marques et al., 2006). 
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From the perspective of agency theory, management is monitored by the board 
that reduces agency costs. The effectiveness of the board increases when they meet 
regularly and show greater work diligence. As a monitoring mechanism, it is easier to get 
better governance by more board meetings to discuss issues (Vafeas, 1999). The resource 
dependency theory perspective argues that board meetings help to convey up-to-date 
information among the directors. This positively contributes to get relevant resources and 
improve intellectual capital. Also, knowledge shared in the board meeting helps to 
generate innovative ideas, policy, and strategy that enhances intellectual capital. 
On the other hand, focusing on the association between intellectual capital and 
firm performance various studies took place. In Ugandan microfinance firms, intellectual 
capital elements were positively related to firm performance (Kamukama et al., 2010). 
Consistently, intellectual capital elements in Taiwan’s information technology industry 
directly affected performance. Only an indirect effect was found between human capital 
and performance, which confirmed that intellectual capital elements must be incorporated 
jointly (Wang & Chang, 2005). Similarly, following resource-based theory and using 
regression analysis Chen et al. (2005) found a positive effect between MBV ratio and 
intellectual capital. Alipour (2012) using the VAIC model examined the relationship with 
ROA in the Iranian insurance companies and found a positive relation. His study was 
supported in Thailand by Phusavat et al. (2011) who also found a positive association 
among intellectual capital, ROA, and ROE. According to Rahman (2012), higher 
intellectual capital efficiency implies higher firm performance. By using the VAIC 
model, Rahman (2012) found a positive relation for 100 UK firms. Thus, the profit-
making capacity of the firm depends on their ability to how they use intellectual capital 
(Safieddine et al., 2009). An important element for the sustainability of firm growth is 
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assumed to be intellectual capital (Safieddine et al., 2009). Finally, Nimtrakoon (2015) 
measured intellectual capital using MVAIC to examine the association between market 
value and firm performance for Asian countries and found firms tend to have higher 
market value and performance (ROA) with higher intellectual capital. Contrary results 
were found where performance was not affected by all components of intellectual capital 
(Huang and Liu, 2005). It was argued that studies showing a positive association between 
intellectual capital and performance were made in the context of developed countries. 
Morariu (2014) found similar results as Huang and Liu (2005) where negative relation 
was found between VAIC - ROE and VAIC -MBV.  
To summarize board structure, intellectual capital, and firm performance 
literature, only three studies were found that was conducted in Uganda and KSA to 
examine the impact of board structure on firm performance through intellectual capital 
(Nkundabanyanga, 2014; Nkundabanyanga, 2016;  Hamdan et al., 2017) and found a 
positive result. This motivates the study to examine the relationship in the context of 
OCED countries (New Zealand). Also, in the context of New Zealand, the literature 
showed only board independence and CEO duality to be positively associated with firm 
performance (Reddy et al., 2010; Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015); board background and 
skill diversity and board meeting to be negatively associated with firm performance 
(Bathula, 2008; Molenkamp, 2015; Ilaboya & Obaretin, 2015); board size, audit 
committee composition, and gender diversity to have no relationship with firm 
performance (Reddy et al., 2010; Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015; Duppati et al., 2017). This 
provides additional motivation to the study to find reasons why some variables had no 
relation and negative relation with firm performance. We assume in this study that the 
cost of capital plays an important role. 
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2.3. Board structure, cost of capital, and firm performance 
Debt and equity (cost of capital) is the return required by the finance suppliers as 
compensation for their contribution of capital to the firm. It can be calculated either by 
the cost of debt/equity or using the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). According 
to Armadeep (2013), debt is cheaper than equity because of tax-deductible but it is risky 
because debt must be re-paid regardless of profit. When the firm is highly leveraged debt 
becomes expensive because the high-interest rate will be charged by the lenders. The 
major role of the cost of capital is played in capital budgeting decisions. An improper 
management of capital and its cost impact capital budgeting decisions, and thereby, the 
firm performance. Therefore, effective corporate governance is needed to monitor 
managers’ actions and at the same time to keep the cost of capital as low as possible.  
A good composition of board of directors is considered good corporate 
governance that helps to reduce the cost of debt/equity (La Porta et al., 1997; Merton, 
1987). Creditors are interested in the cost of debt. When they find firms with a good 
board of directors it signals that the firm can be managed properly, tempting them to 
lower the required rate of return. To protect shareholder’s wealth, firms must control their 
capital cost because the operation of a firm depends on the accessibility of the money and 
the cost at which they get money. Good corporate governance monitors managers’ 
actions reducing the risk of expropriation (Chen et al., 2009). In the context of New 
Zealand, where the market is small, the cost of capital becomes the main issue. Thus, this 
study links board structure, cost of capital, and firm performance. 
Empirical studies (Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978; Wen et al., 2002) have examined 
board structure and cost of debt depending on the argument that debt holder prefers 
monitoring mechanism that controls managers action. They view board composition as a 
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reliable source that can authenticate the integrity of accounting numbers. Therefore, good 
governance reduces the finance supplier’s risk and thereby the risk premium. Fields, 
Fraser & Subrahmanyam (2012) analyzed the quality of the board and debt cost in terms 
of banks loan. They showed that a good board with the availability of more advisory is 
more likely to borrow at a low cost. Even after considering control variables like the 
characteristics of borrower, firm size, CEO compensation policy the relationship existed. 
Also, when the direct and indirect cost of bank loans was combined, firms with lower 
institutional ownership, largely independent, and diverse boards borrowed at a cheaper 
rate. Similarly, constructing an index with 24 governance provisions, Asbaugh-Skaife et 
al. (2006) found that corporate governance affects credit rating. They concluded that 
weak corporate governance implies a high cost of capital. Byun (2007) supported 
Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) study where the negative association was shown between 
debt cost and practices of corporate governance. Indeed, a negative relationship was 
clearer for firms having assets of more than two billion US dollars. 
An important mechanism of corporate governance that ensures firms are operating 
efficiently and competitively are directors (Jensen, 1993). Concerning agency theory, 
Pfeffer & Salancick (1978) found the size of the board and capital structure significantly 
related. Consistent with the study of Pfeffer & Salancick (1978), Wen et al. (2002) found 
capital structure and size of board positively associated. Anderson et al. (2004) added 
there is high monitoring on the financial processes of the organization with the existence 
of a large board due to which cost of debt gets lower. 
A negative association between the cost of capital and board size is supported by 
the resource dependency theory. A large board provides access to various resources 
which signals stakeholder’s representation on board (Goodstein et al., 1994). A large 
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board with qualified experience and knowledge increases communication with various 
stakeholders. This helps to enhance firm value, lower debt/equity cost by shifting risk 
between investors, and lower the asymmetry of information. 
Various studies showed the size of board and capital cost negatively related (Butt 
& Hasan, 2009; Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Hajjha et al., 2013; Lorca et al., 2011). Butt & 
Hasan (2009) studied 114 firms in Pakistan from 2003 to 2007 to examine the impact of 
the size of the board on equity cost. Empirical evidence suggested larger boards lower 
equity costs. In line with Butt & Hasan’s (2009) study, Bozec & Bozec (2011) studied 
from 2002-2005, 155 Canadian firms to see the impact of corporate governance index on 
capital cost. They used fixed-effect regression in the 2SLS framework and found the cost 
of debt/equity decreases whenever the corporate governance practice increases. Lorca et 
al. (2011) found the rate of interest paid is low whenever the board size is large. They 
concluded that creditors consider board attributes when they estimate the default risk. 
Like the results of Butt & Hasan (2009) in Pakistan, Hajiha et al. (2013) also found the 
size of the board and cost of equity to be negatively related in Iran. Finally, Showkat et 
al. (2019), for a sample of 270 Indian firms found board size and independence to be 
negatively associated with the cost of debt, the overall cost of capital, and ineffective 
with the cost of equity. The study concluded that board size and independence severe as 
safety measures for debt lenders. 
By increasing board independence, investors trust the financial information which 
reduces investor cost to seek reliable information. This makes the creditors to demand a 
lower rate of return. Anderson et al. (2004) found independent directors are more 
effective in monitoring the financial accounting process due to which cost of debt 
decreases. Board independence was measured using a dummy variable which was 
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negatively associated with the cost of debt. When the number/proportion of independent 
directors on board is known by debt holders, they get trusted with the monitoring 
mechanism of the firm. Consistently, in France, Piot & Missonier-Piera (2007) showed 
higher the non-executive director lower is the cost of debt. They argued independent 
directors control managers better than other directors which ensures the proper 
functioning of the organization. Pham, Suschard, Zein (2011) studied corporate 
governance mechanisms to explain the cost of capital for Australian firms. Results 
revealed that independent directors and institutional block holders help to reduce firm 
risk, thus, finance suppliers demand low returns. In the Asian context, Anwar et al., 
(2019) supported the study of Piot & Missonier-Piera (2007) in France and found a 
negative association by analyzing 26 Asian countries’ data.  
Contradicting with the study of Anderson et al. (2004), studies showed a positive 
association between cost of capital and non-executive directors (Hajiha et al., 2013; 
Khemakhem & Naciri, 2013) and others found no relation (Lorca et al., 2011; Setiany et 
al., 2017). A positive association was found by Hajiha et al. (2013) who argued that 
independent directors lacked financial and strategic knowledge due to which they were 
unable to create value for creditors increasing debt cost. Contrary, Lorca et al. (2011) 
found no relationship between debt cost and non-executive directors. Consistently, 
Setiany et al. (2017) also did not find any association. 
Ramly (2011) focused on equity cost and examined corporate governance impact 
on 101 Malaysian firms from 2003 to 2007. Corporate governance was operationalized 
using a corporate governance index including quality measures divided into six 
categories. Results revealed that good corporate governance practices reduce the cost of 
equity. Board structure and practices that enhanced audit process, accountability and 
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shareholder right had a significant impact on reducing equity cost. Anderson et al. (2004) 
supported Ramly, (2011) result, where it was found monitoring of the financial 
accounting process in Australian firms was improved by the audit committee. This helped 
to reduce the cost of debt. A audit committee looks after the financial reporting process 
and keep close relations with external auditors regarding financial statements and internal 
controls. Independent members play an important role in the audit committee. 
 Studies reported that female directors avoid managers from earning management 
(Gull et al., 2017), enhance the independence of board (Lucas-Perez et al., 2015), be 
more responsible (Gull et al., 2017) and reduce the cost of agency problem (Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2017). These studies support the argument that finance suppliers reduce 
cost with the presence of female directors due to their effective monitoring and advising 
capability. Usman, Farooq, Zhang, Makki & Khan (2019) support the argument made 
where A-share listed firms on Shanghai stock exchange was studied to examine if gender 
diversity matters to the suppliers of finance or not. They used various kinds of regression 
and found that by the presence of females on board, information asymmetry and 
opportunistic behavior reduces. This lowers debt cost and creditor’s assumption of loan 
default. Interestingly, they also found that suppliers of finance charge four percent less 
with the presence of at least one female compared to zero females on board. 
On the other hand, studies showed female directors have negative consequences. 
Smith et al. (2005) & Petrovic (2008) highlighted factors such as time-consuming in 
decision making, different objectives, lack of quick response in case of market shock, 
increase disagreement within the board and interpersonal conflicts to affect the efficient 
and effective working of the board with the presence of a female. These factors affect 
cooperation and communication reducing board monitoring mechanisms. Thus, finance 
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suppliers charge higher risk premiums. 
Focusing on the relationship between intellectual capital and cost of capital, 
several studies examined the association between disclosure of intellectual capital and 
cost of capital (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Orens et al., 2010; Attig et al., 2013). Better 
information helps investors to make an accurate estimation about future returns, decrease 
the uncertainty, and risk about future profit and flow of cash. This helps to increase 
investors’ confidence, liquidity of trading, and decrease capital cost (Easley & O’Hara, 
2004). Orens et al. (2010) examined continental European firms (Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, and Germany) and found that the non-financial disclosure of web-based tends to 
lower information asymmetry due to which those firms enjoy a lower cost of capital. 
Similar results were found in the study of Boujelbene & Affes (2013) where higher 
intellectual capital disclosure tends to lower equity cost. However, Attig et al. (2013) 
added not all intellectual capital disclosure components/elements impact cost of capital. 
They found disclosure relating to the environment, diversity, community relation and 
employee relation affected credit rating of firms while the dimensions of human rights 
had no impact on the cost of capital. Contradicting with the study of Orens et al. (2010) 
and Attig et al. (2013), disclosure of intellectual capital showed a positive relation with 
equity cost (Richardson & Welker, 2001; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002), whereas, no relation 
was found for North American firms. 
To summarize board structure, cost of capital and firm performance literature 
review, most of the studies concluded that creditors focus on board composition when 
lending money, i.e., whenever they find a female director or the presence of independent 
directors they demand less rate of return (Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam, 2012; 
Showkat et al., 2019; Usman, Farooq, Zhang, Makki & Khan, 2019). Also, there was no 
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study found that examined board structure impact on firm performance through the cost 
of capital. This adds to the motivation to conduct this study and to achieve the main 
research objective. Finally, no literature was found that examined the relationship 
between the cost of capital and firm performance which act as another motivational factor 
to conduct this study. Most of the literature examined only the impact of capital structure 
on firm performance (Reverte, 2011; Wu et al., 2012; Pouraghajan, et al., 2012). 
Finally, to summarize the entire literature review in this study, prior empirical 
studies found no consistent results examining board structure and performance (Reddy et 
al., 2010; Okpara, 2011; Mishra & Mohanty, 2011), board structure and intellectual 
capital (Williams, 2003; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012; Zamani et al., 2012; Appuhami & 
Bhuyan, 2015), board structure and cost of capital (Berger et al., 1997; Asbaugh-Skaife, 
2006; Byun, 2007; Hajj et al., 2013), intellectual capital and firm performance (Chen et 
al., 2005; Wang & Chang, 2005; Kamukama et al., 2010; Rahman, 2012). Also, no study 
was found that examined the cost of capital and firm performance. Instead, capital 
structure and performance were examined. Thus, this adds to the motivation to conduct 
and incorporate the cost of capital in examining the relationship between board structure 
and firm performance. 
Examining the capital structure and corporate performance, a positive association 
was found between WACC, ROE, and ROA (Pouraghajan, et al., 2012). Also, the firm 
size for 121 companies on Swiss stock exchange was found to be associated negatively 
with ROE when examining disclosure of corporate with capital cost (Perova et al.,2012). 
Contrary to these studies, Wu et al. (2012) and Reverte, (2011) revealed an association 
between capital structure and TOBINQ to be positive when examining 484 Taiwanese 
firms from 2007 to 2010. 
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Inconsistent results are found in the studies due to the different proxies used for 
board structure, firm performance, and intellectual capital. Also, no study to the best of 
our knowledge was found that studied board structure impact on performance through the 
cost of capital. Also, in terms of intellectual capital only three studies (Nkundabanyanga, 
2014; Nkundabanyanga et al., 2016; Hamdan et al., 2017) were found that examined 
board structure impact on performance through intellectual capital. In the New Zealand 
context, no study was found that examined board structure, intellectual capital, firm 
performance or board structure, cost of capital, and firm performance. Studies found in 
New Zealand context were interlocking directorship effect on performance (Bhuiyan & 
Roudaki, 2013), corporate governance compliance (Bhuiyan et al., 2013), female 
representation on board effect on performance (Duppati et al., 2017), board and 
ownership structure and performance (Fauzi & Locke, 2012), Companies Act 1993 effect 
on board and performance (Hossain et al., 2001), financing patterns, corporate 
governance and cost of capital (Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2014). 
Therefore, this study fills the gap in the New Zealand context by incorporating 
intellectual capital and cost of capital variables in examining board structure and firm 
performance which none of the studies in the literature conducted. Also, the main 
contribution and aim of this study are to join the two streams of literature discussed above 
into one i.e., we examine board structure, intellectual capital, cost of capital and firm 






CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section explains three 
theories that are suitable for the study i.e., resource dependency theory, agency theory 
and resource-based view theory. The second section illustrates the theoretical framework 
for the study. Following, the last section where the hypothesis for the study is developed. 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
According to Chapter two, prior studies have used resource-based and resource 
dependency theory to examine board structure and intellectual capital (Goodstein, 
Gautam & Boeker, 1994; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012; Nkundabanyanga et al., 2014; 
Nkundabanyanga, 2016) and agency theory to examine the effect of cost of capital 
(Berger et al., 1997; Andersen et al., 2004). To understand and predict specific 
phenomena a theoretical framework is used. 
It was argued by Filatotchev & Boyd (2009) that usage of a single theory limits 
the explanatory power and creates a problem due to its narrow assumptions. A call for 
multiple theoretical approaches is enhanced for better hypothesis development and 
finding interpretations. This study examines board structure, intellectual capital, cost of 
capital, and firm performance and therefore applies theory triangulation method by using 
three theories i.e., resource dependency, resource-based and agency theory to explain the 
relationship. The use of multiple theories in examining a phenomenon is referred to as 
theory triangulation (Denzin, 1970). Theory triangulation provides an alternative 
interpretation of the same phenomena where a single theory lacks to provide a multi-
dimensional interpretation of the issues (Hoque, 2006). The selection of these theories is 
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based on the link to corporate governance and prior studies. Thus, theories used fits the 
nature of this study to examine the relationship between board structure, intellectual 
capital, cost of capital, and firm performance. 
3.1.1. Resource dependency theory 
Resource dependency theory drives from management discipline for which there 
exists no specific resource definition (Nicholson & Kiel (2007). Resource dependency 
theory views that a firm operates in an environment that relies on the external 
environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). It is explained that the directors’ role is to get 
resources and manage firms’ reliance on these acquired resources for superior 
performance. Board act as a link between the firm and critical resources. Pfeffer & 
Salancik (1978) explained that when a person gets appointed to the board, he/she brings 
skills, knowledge, and connection to the firm. However, there are four main resources 
that the board brings to the firm namely, easy access to critical resources in the 
environment, counseling and advice to management, reputation, and information (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). Therefore, directors are not responsible for monitoring/controlling 
management but also to increase firms’ value by bringing resources to the firm. 
The resource dependency theory also looks at the board composition. The 
proactive behavior of board members is also dependent on their skills, experience, and 
connection (Tong et al., 2013). This theory views board size, independent directors, 
foreign ownership as components in the board that extracts resources from the 
environment. Also, the resource dependency theory emphasizes that the board plays a 
strategic role in decision-making. Independent directors help in information acquisition 
and firm borrowing (Tong et al., 2013). 
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Thompson & McEwen (1958) argued that when a firm has high debt, they appoint 
a bank officer in their board for easy access to money. Similarly, when firms have 
solvency problem, representatives of a financial institution is appointed in the board 
(Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988). Also, when firms suffer from bad performance executive 
directors are replaced with experienced independent directors to provide a fresh 
perspective to the board (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Thus, the resource dependency theory 
views board as an important resource in two ways; first by their connection with the 
external environment and second by the expertise and knowledge of the directors. 
The resource dependency theory explores how external resources affect 
organizational behavior. Since the organization deals with customers, suppliers, 
government etc. they get affected. The board of directors acts as the organization wheel 
for which they should interact with these external resources and try to acquire it to 
enhance the performance and intellectual capital of the firm. 
Linking resource dependency theory to this study, board structure (board size, 
gender diversity, audit committee etc.) will provide communication channels and 
networks among corporations (Liu et al., 2013). This will improve the relationship with 
the external environment and various sources of finance (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2015). 
Thus, a good board composition will monitor, control, and enhance the intellectual capital 
of the firm (Williams, 2000; Zamani et al., 2012; Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). Due to the 
director’s competence, there will be a positive impact on the firm leading to productivity, 
work performance and customer loyalty (Dave, 1998). Similarly, Turkoglu (2016), adds 
that human capital is the accumulation of information that directors bring with them when 
they work and that they take when they leave. Improving human capital will increase 
firms’ relational capital, thereby intellectual capital. 
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3.1.2. Resource-based view theory 
It is one of the organizational behavior theories. This theory suggests that 
resources within the firm help create a competitive advantage (Jensen & Meckling, 
2006). Firms should look for a source of competitive advantage within the firm instead of 
searching externally. Barney (1991) argues that firms should use existing resources 
within the firm to take advantage of external opportunities. 
This theory is based on two assumptions; first, firms achieve competitive 
advantage by the creation of skills, knowledge, culture which is not easily copied by 
other firms (Jensen & Meckling, 2006). Second, firms must have immobile resources by 
which sustainable competitive advantage can be created. Firms must have human capital, 
social interaction, organizational process, educational opportunities to create immobile 
resources (Jensen & Meckling, 2006). 
This theory suggests intellectual capital to be a package of assets (knowledge) 
which is regarded as an important resource to enhance performance (Carlucci & Schiuma, 
2007). Directors are useful resources along with firms’ intellectual capital, thus, a 
combination of intellectual capital along with the role of board governance enhances 
performance. Safieddine et al. (2009) argued that firms make a profit depending on how 
resources are used at their disposal. 
Linking resource-based view theory in the context of this study, we examine 
intellectual capital and the cost of capital from a resource-based view perspective. It is 
argued that when firms have high intellectual capital efficiency, they will be in a better 
position to benefit from external opportunities to acquire funds at a lower cost. This is 
because a good board structure will have the connection, expertise, and knowledge which 
increases intellectual capital (resource-dependency theory) and at the same time board 
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will utilize these resources to help firms acquire funds at a lower cost (resource-based 
view theory). Therefore, a good board structure increases intellectual capital efficiency 
through which capital cost is lowered. 
 As discussed in chapter two, to the best of our knowledge no studies are found 
that link intellectual capital and cost of capital. Studies have only examined intellectual 
capital disclosure impact on the cost of capital from agency theory perspective 
(Richardson & Welker, 2001; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Orens et al., 2010; Boujelbene 
& Affes, 2013; Attig et al., 2013). 
3.1.3. Agency theory 
This theory relies on the foundation that there is a separation between 
management (agent) and owners (principal) which results in agency cost to solve the 
conflict between them (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Besides, the theory assumes managers 
to be self-centered and self-interested that do not care for the interest of shareholders. 
Managers have more firm information and knowledge which makes them in a better 
position to fulfill their interests instead of the shareholder’s interest (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). For instance, they provide themselves with unimaginable remuneration package, 
use company resources to fulfill their interest, or may not work in the shareholders’ 
interest by not devoting skill and time for new projects. The self-interest of managers 
increases the cost of organization in terms of monitoring/controlling managers action 
which affects companies’ profitability and compromise shareholders interest. Agency 
problem occurs when there are different goals between principals-agents and it is difficult 
for the principal to see what the agent is doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency theory suggests three agency issues: separation of control-ownership, 
conflict of interest between firms and external contractors like creditors, employees, and 
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conflict of interest among shareholders. First, separation of control-ownership is where a 
large number of shareholders are unable to monitor or participate in daily actions. 
Therefore, they select board members i.e., the board of directors to monitor managers. 
Second, the conflict of the firm with creditors is where the company acts as an agent and 
invest in risky projects for higher returns. In this case, the company will capture profit 
where the cost will be transferred to the creditors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, 
through monitoring mechanisms and restrictive covenants creditors try to protect 
themselves. Finally, according to Shleifer & Vishny (1997), conflict of interest among 
shareholders occur when minority shareholders become the principals, and majority 
shareholder’s become agents. Minority shareholders have fewer voting rights and power 
to influence the management of the firm. Thus, minority shareholders depend on majority 
shareholders for monitoring the firm. 
This theory suggests that agency costs can be reduced by internal/external control 
systems such as the corporate governance mechanism (Hudaib & Haniffa, 2006). Internal 
mechanisms like auditing, the board of directors, independent external auditors, and 
independent non-executive directors helps to monitor agents. External corporate 
governance mechanism can be the market itself assuming it is an efficient market. Thus, 
corporate governance structure reduces agency cost which increases firms’ value by 
increasing future cash inflow. 
In the context of this study, agency theory is applied to explain the relationship 
between board structure- intellectual capital and intellectual capital-cost of capital. When 
firms’ have good board composition with skills, expertise, and knowledge it will enhance 
the intellectual capital of the firm (resource-dependency theory) and board composition 
will also act as effective monitoring of the management (agency theory). Therefore, 
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agency costs will be decreased implying lower capital cost. Mande et al. (2012) argue 
agency costs related to debt and equity can be reduced with the implementation and 
adoption of the corporate governance structure. Therefore, it is expected that good 
practices of corporate governance will decrease the cost of debt/equity, thereby, cost of 
capital. This will improve the firm performance because corporate governance is 
designed to lower agency problems which reduce agency cost. 
According to New Zealand’s listing rule 10.4.5 requires companies to disclose 
gender diversity in their annual report. Also, the best corporate governance practice of 
New Zealand requires the disclosure of director’s remuneration and board composition. 
Therefore, assuming firms disclose their corporate governance structure, where an 
independent director is appointed then the intellectual capital will get enhanced (resource-
dependency theory) and at the same time this independent director will be considered as 
an effective mechanism to monitor agents. So, when finance suppliers know that a non-
executive director exists in the board, they get confidence, where agency cost, default 
risk, demand for the rate of return decreases implying a lower cost of capital. Thus, it is 
argued that when a firm has a good board structure, there will be high intellectual capital 
efficiency through which firms will experience a low cost of capital. As discussed in 
chapter two, there are various studies found that a good corporate governance structure 
decreases the cost of capital (Berger et al., 1997; Andersen et al., 2004; Bozec & Bozec, 
2011; Lorca et al., 2011). 
Finally, to conclude this study has used theory triangulation (resource dependency 
theory, resource-based view theory, and agency theory) to examine the relationship 
between board structure, intellectual capital, cost of capital, and firm performance. The 
three theories used in this study are integrated and fit into the conceptual framework of 
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the study. Resource dependency theory says firms will bring resources from outside for 
better performance of the board and as a result the increased skills or knowledge of the 
board will be utilized to enhance intellectual capital which is supported by resource-based 
view theory. Once, the intellectual capital efficiency is enhanced it reflects the effective 
monitoring mechanism of the board due to which creditors will demand a lower rate of 
return which is supported by agency theory. Thus, an integration between the three 
theories used in the study exists which fits into the conceptual framework proposed. 








Figure 3. 1.Conceptual framework  
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Figure 3.1. illustrates the conceptual framework of this study. The straight line 
between the variables is the main study based on which hypothesis will be made and 
tested. The indirect relationship of board structure and firm performance with the 
mediating effect of intellectual capital is shown by the blue line. The indirect relationship 
of board structure and firm performance with the mediating effect of the cost of capital is 
shown by the green line. Finally, the indirect relationship of board structure on firm 
performance through intellectual capital and cost of capital is shown by the black line 
where board structure impacts intellectual capital (from the perspective of resource-
dependency and agency theory) through which cost of capital will be impacted (from the 
perspective of resource-based view and agency theory) and then firm performance.  
The dotted lines between the variables indicate the secondary objectives of the 
study where dotted line exist between (1) board structure and firm performance (2) board 
structure and intellectual capital (3) board structure and cost of capital (4) intellectual 
capital and firm performance (5) intellectual capital and cost of capital (6) cost of capital 
and firm performance. 
3.3.Hypothesis development 
Depending on the literature review, theories and the conceptual framework 
illustrated, below hypothesis are developed for the seven measures of board structure that 
is to be tested later in this study. 
3.3.1. Board size 
The appropriate size of the board is still debated in literature based on different 
perspectives. Some authors suggested smaller board size improves firm performance 
(Lorsch & Lipton, 1992; Hudaib & Haniffa, 2006; Ozkan, 2011) while others argued the 
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opposite (Uadiale, 2010; Reddy et al., 2010). 
Scholars argue that small boards are better in terms of communication and 
coordination (Jensen, 1993). As the size of the board increases, it becomes difficult to 
communicate which might lead to conflict. Empirical studies showed firm performance 
decreases with a larger board size (Donnelly & Kelly, 2005). On the other hand, a large 
board is said to be effective than a small board because it enhances the monitoring 
mechanism and makes resources available. Studies showed a positive relationship 
between the size of the board and firm performance (Zahra, 1989; Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
Based on the conceptual framework, large board size signals increased access to 
resources (such as new raw material, new market, technology), knowledge, and expertise 
of the board of directors which positively affects intellectual capital. This large board has 
more opportunities to have directors with industry experience and a high educational 
level which helps to provide high-quality advice to management. The service role of the 
director is to improve company reputation, serve as advisors to executives, and set up 
contact with externals (Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978). Therefore, from a resource-based 
view theory perspective, the large board are in a better position to use their knowledge 
and expertise. This helps to create effective relation with externals and secure resources 
for the organizational operation which improves firms’ intellectual capital and firm 
performance. Thus, we assume that board size will efficiently utilize intellectual capital 
which will positively impact firm performance (Lorsch & Lipton, 1992; Hudaib & 
Haniffa, 2006; Ozkan, 2011). Therefore, we hypothesis below:- 
H1a: Intellectual capital positively mediates the relationship between board size 
and firm performance. 
H1c: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
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H1d: There is a positive relationship between board size and intellectual capital. 
On the other hand, from a resource-based view theory perspective, firms will 
utilize their intellectual capital in terms of directors skills, knowledge to increase firm 
value. As a result, creditors get satisfied that there will be no default risk and firm will be 
managed properly (Chen et al., 2009). However, due to the absence of intellectual capital 
in the mediation effect of cost of capital, we hypothesis:  
H1b: Cost of capital negatively mediates the relationship between board size and 
firm performance. 
 From an agency theory perspective, larger board size acts as an effective 
monitoring mechanism for management that helps to reduce agency costs and improve 
firm performance (Uadiale, 2010; Reddy et al., 2010). Also, Fields, Fraser & 
Subrahmanyam (2012) added that creditors focus on the board structure composition 
when lending money. With larger board size and a larger proportion of independent 
directors, creditors demand a lower rate of return (Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam, 
2012). Thus, we hypothesis :- 
H1e: There is a negative relationship between board size and cost of capital. 
3.3.2. Board independence 
With majority independent directors, the board is said to be independent. 
Independent directors provide contacts, prestige, and expertise needed by the managers to 
make decisions about intellectual capital (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Also, non-executive 
directors play a wide range of roles that help in executing a firm’s strategy affecting firm 
performance (Kroll et al., 2007). 
Mixed results between board independence and firm performance are seen in prior 
literature. Some argued that independent directors in the board may be politicians or 
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environmental activists due to which they do not add value to the firm and the result 
showed a negative relation (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). While, others argued negative 
relation resulted because of the unqualified independent directors (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). However, a positive relation was also found where independent directors helped in 
inter-company loans, excess return, and reduced wastage of firm resources (Rosenstein & 
Wyatt, 1990; Ho & Williams, 2003). 
Independent directors prefer to show to the board that they are performing well so 
they are more conducive towards the goal, mission, and strategy of the organization. 
Besides, they come with a different background from different organizations bringing 
more knowledge and skill compared to inside directors who are vested only within their 
working place. Independent directors provide up-to-date operational information to the 
board, provide better decision-making basis. This help in protecting the firm from the 
external environment by reducing uncertainty, suggesting resources that can increase 
firms’ recognition and status, exchange information and represent the firm to 
stakeholders (resource-based view theory). Independent directors through their 
connection with externals, experience, knowledge, and skills can improve a firm’s 
intellectual capital and increase firm performance. Thus, the below hypothesis is 
developed:  
H2a: Intellectual capital positively mediates the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. 
H2c: There is a positive relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. 
H2d: There is a positive relationship between board independence and intellectual 
capital. 
54  
As per agency theory, independent directors who have no relationship with the 
company are more likely to monitor effectively, balance the board (Hudaib & Haniffa, 
2006) and reduce information asymmetry by which creditors trust in lending capital to the 
firm. Creditors trust independent directors as the source to validate and authenticate the 
control process and accounting numbers (Usman, Farooq, Zhang, Makki & Khan, 2019). 
Thus, we see a negative association between board independence and the cost of capital. 
However, when board structure impacts firm performance through the cost of capital 
there is a lack of intellectual capital utilization (resource-based view theory) or signals 
provided by independent directors to creditors about the firm in terms of board 
knowledge, skills, or external relation. Therefore, we hypothesis below:- 
H2b: Cost of capital negatively mediates the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. 
On the other hand, from an agency theory perspective, independent directors 
reduce agency costs, balance the board, and challenge CEO which makes default risk 
lower i.e., lower cost of capital (Anderson et al., 2004; Anwar et al., 2019). Therefore, we 
hypothesis below: 
H2e: There is a negative relationship between board independence and the cost of 
capital. 
3.3.3. CEO duality 
When a person is board chairman and at the same time holds CEO position 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994) it is said that CEO duality exists. Regarding agency 
theory, CEO duality leads to a conflict of interest and ignores the monitoring mechanism 
of the board of directors that protects the interest of shareholders. The board of directors 
is not effective unless it controls decisions made by the top people (Fama & Jensen, 
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1983). CEO duality has a greater power that can affect board independence which is 
needed to control the opportunistic behavior of the CEO. 
Empirical studies showed inconsistent results with positive, negative, and no 
relationship between CEO duality and performance (Kesner, 1988; Elsayed, 2007; Chen 
et al., 2008; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009; Bliss, 2011; Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). Vafeas 
& Theodorou (1998) found no relationship prevails between CEO duality and firm 
performance and argued that it depends on the personal characteristics of the person. 
Contrary, Appuhami & Bhuyan (2015) found the CEO to be positively associated with 
intellectual capital showing the efficient use of intellectual capital by the firm. Power 
concentration motivates a person to increase firm value through intellectual capital. 
CEO duality control board meetings and put self-interest ahead (Boivie et al., 
2011). This opportunistic behavior of CEO duality suggests that CEO duality uses 
organizational resources for their welfare to increase status and prestige without making 
effective intellectual capital decisions. When board structure comprises CEO duality 
intellectual capital will not be utilized efficiently due to which negative mediation on 
performance is assumed. Thus, from an agency theory perspective, CEO duality avoids 
efficient and effective intellectual capital decisions and reduces the value of shareholders 
and negatively impacts firm performance (Chen et al., 2008; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). 
Therefore, the below hypothesis is developed: 
H3a: Intellectual capital negatively mediates the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. 
H3c: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
H3d: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and intellectual 
capital. 
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 Also, from an agency theory perspective, the cost of capital increases as CEO 
duality does not enhance intellectual capital, negatively impacting performance. Also, 
because CEO duality is viewed as poor corporate governance in New Zealand (Pham, 
Suschard, Zein, 2011), creditors will demand a higher rate of return as default risk 
increases. Thus, the combination of a higher rate of return along with CEO duality will 
negatively impact performance and due to which we hypothesis: 
H3b: Cost of capital negatively mediates the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance. 
As argued by Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam (2012) that creditors focus on 
board composition when lending capital. The existence of CEO duality increases the 
probability of self-interest by the CEO. Also, the internal behavioral mechanism of the 
firm will not function efficiently to monitor managers’ actions to protect shareholder’s 
interests as suggested by agency theory. Thus, creditors charge a higher premium rate, 
and therefore we hypothesis the below: 
H3e: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and the cost of capital. 
3.3.4. Audit committee composition 
Listing rules and governance code of New Zealand requires issuers on the stock 
exchange to have an audit committee with minimum three directors, where the majority 
should be independent and at least one with accounting/finance background. There are a 
growing number of studies examining the relationship between performance and audit 
committee (Chan & Li, 2008; Saibaba & Ansari, 2013; Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). 
From an agency theory perspective, an independent audit committee helps the 
board in decision-making (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Due to the high proportion of 
independent directors in the audit committee, the monitoring function increases, the 
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internal control process gets enhanced, and the information asymmetry gets reduced 
(Keenan & Aggestam, 2001; Jing et al., 2008). Thus, the establishment of an audit 
committee ensures the opportunistic behavior is controlled and the organizational 
resources are used efficiently for effective investment in intellectual capital to enhance 
value of shareholders and firm performance. From the resource dependency theory 
perspective, the audit committee is regarded as a bundle of resources and knowledge 
because the majority are independent directors in audit committee with diverse skills and 
knowledge. Audit committee works closely with the board and communicates issues 
relating to internal controls, financial reporting, provide an overview of ethics and 
compliance, risk management etc. This helps the board of directors to gain information 
and ideas from the audit committee composed of majority independent directors to make 
effective decisions. The independent members in the audit committee are in a better 
position to utilize intellectual capital efficiency and add value to increase firm 
performance (Chan & Li, 2008; Saibaba & Ansari, 2013). Therefore, the below 
hypothesis is developed: 
H4a: Intellectual capital positively mediates the relationship between audit 
committee composition and firm performance. 
H4c: There is a positive relationship between audit committee composition and 
firm performance. 
H4d: There is a positive relationship between audit committee composition and 
intellectual capital. 
From the perspective of agency theory, independent members in the audit 
committee can effectively monitor the internal control process of the organization, 
maintain good relations with the external auditor, verify financial statements, etc. (Chan 
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& Li, 2008; Saibaba & Ansari, 2013). Thus, the existence of an audit committee satisfies 
the requirements of creditors that the probability of default risk will be low (Anderson et 
al., 2004; Ramly, 2011). Therefore, this reduces the cost of capital. However, when the 
cost of capital mediates the relationship between audit committee composition and firm 
performance there is an absence of intellectual capital, which contradicts the theory of 
resource-based view i.e., audit committee composition will not be able to utilize their 
skills to influence creditors. Therefore, we hypothesis below: 
H4b: Cost of capital negatively mediates the relationship between audit 
committee composition and firm performance. 
On the other hand, Ramly (2011) argues that the audit committee looks after the 
financial reporting process and keep close relations with external auditors regarding 
financial statements and internal controls. From an agency theory perspective, we add 
that independent members play an important role in the audit committee by performing 
an effective monitoring mechanism in terms of internal controls which assures creditors 
about their money. Thus, default risk reduces and therefore we hypothesis the below: 
H4e: There is a negative relationship between audit committee composition and 
the cost of capital. 
3.3.5. Gender diversity 
The positive relation between female diversity and firm performance was found in 
prior literature (Provan, 1980; Kesner, 1988; Mitchell Williams, 2000). Also, it was 
found that firms with female directors are more involved in charity (Williams, 2003). On 
the other hand, contrary results were found showing fewer females improves performance 
in a better way (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Fauzi & Locke; 2012). Female directors have 
different cognitive frames such as information seeking and information evaluation 
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processes which enhances firm performance compared to male directors. They 
incorporate community issues within the organization’s development and growth, thus, 
broaden the scope of boards’ decision-making process. Besides, female presence on 
board enforces firms to look for more talented employees within the labor market because 
females can attract and communicate with larger employees increasing competitive 
abilities within the firm (Graves & Powell, 1988). They provide innovation and 
generation of ideas and helps in strategic change.  
From the resource-dependency theory perspective, gender diversity is based on 
the perspectives, experience, problem-solving approaches, and social network relation 
that they bring to the board. Also, from the resource-based view theory perspective 
females can use those skills to efficiently invest in intellectual capital and increase firm 
performance. In line with prior studies, (Terjesen et al.,2015; Christiansen et al., 2016; 
Zahoor, 2016) it is argued that females can contribute and add value to the intellectual 
capital efficiency of the firm, Therefore, below hypothesis are developed: 
H5a: Intellectual capital positively mediates the relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance. 
H5c: There is a positive relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance. 
H5d: There is a positive relationship between gender diversity and intellectual 
capital. 
Similarly, females lack quick response in case of market shock, increase 
disagreement within the board, and create interpersonal conflicts that affect the efficient 
and effective working of the board (Smith et al., 2005; Petrovic, 2008). These factors 
affect cooperation and communication reducing board monitoring mechanisms (agency 
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theory), thereby, finance suppliers charge higher risk premiums (Smith et al., 2005; 
Petrovic, 2008). Also, from resource-based view theory perspective female directors use 
their cognitive skills to influence creditors but due to the absence of intellectual capital 
through the mediation effect of cost of capital we hypothesis the below: 
H5b: Cost of capital negatively mediates the relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance. 
In line with the study of Lucas-Perez et al (2015), Gull et al. (2017) and Usman, 
Farooq, Zhang, Makki & Khan (2019) female directors showed a negative association 
with cost of capital. It is argued from the agency theory perspective that female directors 
avoid managers from earning management, enhance the independence of the board, be 
more responsible, and reduce the cost of the agency problem. Thus, creditors believe 
default risk to be minimal with the presence of females on board and demand a lower rate 
of return Gull et al., 2017). There, we hypothesis the below: 
H5e: There is a negative relationship between gender diversity and the cost of 
capital. 
3.3.6. Board background and skill diversity  
The skill diversity of directors’ increases board effectiveness in terms of the high 
level of integrity, judgment, experience, and intellectual ability (Hilmer, 1998). They 
provide a mixture of competencies and capabilities which provide a different perspective 
in decision-making (Carver, 2002). Qualified board member provides knowledge base 
environment enhancing a thoughtful process to solve problems and provide innovative 
ideas to develop policies. Also, boards with greater educational qualification are more 
likely to be flexible, have a better ability to accept innovation, and adopt new ideas and 
have greater capabilities to process information. These characteristics of board members 
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help them to create policies and strategies on how to best use, obtain, and enhance 
intellectual capital resources. On the contrary, board with less skill level will result in a 
lack of innovation and thinking. 
Supporting the above arguments, prior studies showed board members with 
industrial experience and skills to be associated positively with Tobin-Q and ROA 
(Girbina et al., 2012; Darmadi, 2013). From a resource-based view theory perspective, 
when board members are highly qualified, they will have a higher level of skills and 
knowledge i.e., positively affecting intellectual capital efficiency and firm performance. 
Thus, the below hypothesis is developed: 
H6a: Intellectual capital positively mediates the relationship between board 
background and skill diversity and firm performance. 
H6c: There is a positive relationship between board background and skill diversity 
and firm performance. 
H6d: There is a positive relationship between board background and skill 
diversity and intellectual capital. 
Resource- based view theory argues that board background and skill diversity 
helps the board to come up with innovative ideas, a various solution to problems as 
directors vary with different educational background and level (Ruigrok et al., 2006; 
Wincent et al., 2010). Thus, directors skill and education will help to improve intellectual 
capital efficiency and influence creditors to demand a lower rate of return. However, due 
to the mediating effect of cost of capital alone, board background and skill diversity may 
not contribute positively to firm performance due to the missing effect of intellectual 
capital efficiency that influences creditors to trust corporate governance of the firm. 
Therefore, we hypothesis the below: 
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H6b: Cost of capital negatively mediates the relationship between board 
background and skill diversity and firm performance. 
From an agency theory perspective, when board members are highly qualified, 
they can monitor management more effectively, reducing agency costs. Also, creditors 
will get the confidence and trust that the default risk will be lower due to the presence of 
highly educated board members, thereby demand lower rates of return (Easley & O’Hara, 
2004). Thus, below hypothesis is developed: 
H6e: There is a negative relationship between board background and skill 
diversity and the cost of capital. 
3.3.7. Board meeting 
Firms that conduct regular board meetings can manage themselves during a 
difficult time. Managers can take effective decisions as they get supported by the board 
meeting where the problem is understood and discussed in a better way (Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2008). Board meeting helps to develop intellectual capital because it 
provides counseling to management and provides extensive strategic advice. Thus, firms 
are in a better position to formulate policies and strategies to get resources related to 
intellectual capital (Marques et al., 2006). Resource dependency theory argues board 
meetings help to convey up-to-date information among the directors which positively 
contributes to get relevant resources and improve intellectual capital and firm 
performance. Also, knowledge shared in the board meeting helps to generate innovative 
ideas, policy, and strategy that enhances intellectual capital, thereby firm performance. 
Therefore, the below hypothesis is developed: 
H7a: Intellectual capital positively mediates the relationship between a board 
meeting and firm performance. 
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H7c: There is a positive relationship between board meeting and firm 
performance. 
H7d: There is a positive relationship between board meeting and intellectual 
capital. 
The impact of the board meeting on firm performance through the mediation 
effect of cost of capital is assumed to be negative because agency theory argues board 
meeting enhances the monitoring mechanism which improves performance (Vafeas, 
1999). However, when the cost of capital alone mediates without the interaction of 
intellectual capital, creditors are not influenced to lower the required rate of return. Thus, 
we hypothesis below: 
H7b: Cost of capital negatively mediates the relationship between board meeting 
and firm performance. 
From the perspective of agency theory, management is monitored by the board 
that reduces agency costs. The effectiveness of the board increases when they meet 
regularly and show greater work diligence. As a monitoring mechanism, it is easier to get 
better governance by more board meetings to discuss issues (Vafeas, 1999). As a result, 
board meetings help to convey up-to-date information among the directors which 
positively contributes to set strategic decisions. Therefore, creditors demand a lower rate 
of return due to increased board meeting and trust in the monitoring mechanism of the 
firm (Marques et al., 2006). Hence, we develop below hypothesis: 
H7e: There is a negative relationship between board meetings and the cost of 
capital. 
In addition to all the above developed hypotheses, to achieve secondary research 
objectives 4,5 and 6 we develop three additional hypotheses.  
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According to the resource-based view theory, intellectual capital is said to be a 
package of assets (knowledge) which is regarded as an important resource to enhance 
performance (Carlucci & Schiuma, 2007). Directors are useful resources along with firms’ 
intellectual capital, thus, a combination of intellectual capital along with the role of board 
governance enhances performance. According to Rahman (2012), higher intellectual 
capital efficiency implies higher firm performance. By using the VAIC model, Rahman 
(2012) found a positive relation for 100 UK firms. Thus, the profit-making capacity of the 
firm depends on their ability to how they use intellectual capital (Safieddine et al., 2009). 
An important element for the sustainability of firm growth is assumed to be intellectual 
capital (Safieddine et al., 2009). Therefore, we hypothesis: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between intellectual capital and firm 
performance. 
Similarly, resource-based view theory suggests that firms will be in a better 
position to get funds at a lower cost with higher intellectual capital efficiency (Easley & 
O’Hara, 2004; Orens et al., 2010). This is because firms will have the required skills, 
connection to seek lenders’ trust and acquire capital at a lower cost which positively 
impacts performance (Safieddine et al., 2009). Therefore, the below hypothesis is 
developed: 
H9: There is a negative relationship between intellectual capital and cost of capital. 






CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter is divided into five sections. First, research design to answer the 
research question proposed in this study is discussed followed by a research context. 
Second, the sample selected for the study and the reasoning is provided. Followed, by the 
process and source for collecting variables data in the study is explained. Finally, the 
operationalization of dependent (endogenous), independent (exogenous) and control 
variables are explained in the last section. 
4.1. Research design 
A general plan to run research to answer the research question is defined as a 
research design. It also includes the procedures to collect information needed. This study 
uses panel data analysis which is used when the dataset consists of both cross-sectional 
elements and time series, specifically when studying multiple variables over a period. 
With a larger data set, panel data provide variability with less collinearity compared to 
cross-section/time-series data. Apart from the informative data provided, panel data helps 
to get more reliable estimates. On the other hand, panel data may cause problems due to 
large data collection and management. 
However, to examine the relationship between board structure, intellectual capital, 
cost of capital, and firm performance this study uses path analysis which is explained in 
detail in the next chapter. 
This study relies on the positivist paradigm using quantitative techniques with 
deducting reasoning. The positivist approach is where the researcher views reality as 
measurable and objective and the research looks to explain the effects and causes (Collis 
& Hussey, 2003). The reasoning in this study is deductive because the first hypothesis is 
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developed and then data is collected to either accept or reject the hypothesis (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003). Therefore, quantitative data and techniques will be applied in this study to 
test the hypothesis. The quantitative method supports a statistical method for analysis, 
rigorous measurement, and data collection from either primary/secondary sources. The 
quantitative method can generalize results for a larger population but fails to provide an 
in-depth understanding. 
4.2. Research context 
The context of New Zealand has been selected in this study due to a lack of prior 
studies that focused on New Zealand compared to other OECD countries regarding 
corporate governance. Also, as found in chapter two, studies conducted in New Zealand 
context were interlocking directorship effect on performance (Bhuiyan & Roudaki, 
2013), corporate governance compliance (Bhuiyan et al., 2013), female representation on 
board effect on performance (Duppati et al., 2017), board and ownership structure and 
performance (Fauzi & Locke, 2012), Companies Act 1993 effect on board and 
performance (Hossain et al., 2001), financing patterns, corporate governance and cost of 
capital (Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2014). There is no study found in the context of New 
Zealand that examined the effect/relation of intellectual capital. This lacked acted as a 
motivation to choose New Zealand and compare the findings with other OECD countries. 
Also, the corporate governance practices reform from 2003 to 2017 motivated to conduct 
the study to investigate how New Zealand firms board structure impacted firm 
performance.  
The continuous corporate governance reforms in New Zealand indicate the effort 
exercised by the policymakers, regulators to help improve firm performance and gain the 
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trust of stakeholders in terms of corporate governance. As the New Zealand stock market 
is home for most of Asia’s Pacific dynamic and successful companies, policymakers are 
always keen to update corporate governance policy for an efficient capital market (New 
Zealand Corporate Governance, 2019). The goal of these efforts of policymakers can be 
achieved by the result of this study to understand how intellectual capital and cost of 
capital mediate the relationship between board structure and firm performance. In 
addition, countries geographically located near New Zealand and that share the same 
business characteristics are likely to find the result of this study relevant. Therefore, 
selection of New Zealand context is based on two reasons (1) no prior studies 
incorporating intellectual capital were examined in the context of New Zealand (2) this 
study can have major practical implications in New Zealand, especially where the 
ownership concentration is very high to improve the efficiency of the capital market and 
firm performance.  
4.3. Sample 
This study focuses on firms listed on New Zealand’s stock exchange which 
constitutes the NZX 50 Index. The NZX50 is the market index that checks the 
performance of 50 largest publicly listed companies. One reason for selecting the top 50 
companies is because large companies have greater intellectual capital. This would 
provide a better understanding of the study to examine the relationship between board 
structure, intellectual capital, cost of capital and firm performance. Second, the study can 
be applicable and examined for all types of companies and operations. Third, New 
Zealand’s corporate governance code, Companies Act 1993 applies to all listed 
companies constituting the NZX50 index. Top companies would have more disclosure of 
68  
the variables incorporated in the study compared to small and less liquid firms listed on 
the stock exchange. 
The time interval of this study is 10 years i.e., from 2010 to 2019. All 50 
companies forming the NZX 50 index are included in the study. However, 9 firms were 
removed from our sample (4 firms were established within the period of our study and 5 
firms had insufficient data) leaving a sample of 41 companies with 410 observations. 
However, after the normality test 19 observations were removed, and 391 observations 
were left as the final sample size. The 41 sample firms selected are classified by the 

















Table 4. 1. Sample firms classified by industrial sector 
Industrial sector Number of firms 
Airport Services and Airlines 
Diversified Banks and REITs 
Health Care Facilities & Equipment 
Packaged Foods & Meats 
Electric Utilities 
Alternative Carriers 
Health Care Distributors 
Construction Materials 
Air Freight & Logistics 




Financial Exchanges & Data 
Marine Ports & Services 
Restaurants 
Casinos & Gaming 
Industrial Machinery 
Cable & Satellite 
Integrated Telecommunication Services 
Trucking 































4.4. Data collection 
Data for the independent, dependent and control variables are collected from 
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters database is considered as a 
corporate governance data source that has been used in literature for its credibility and 
reliability (Maury, 2006; Kim & Lim, 2010). However, some missing variables data were 
collected manually from the annual report. Each company’s annual report was 
downloaded from their specific website. Finally, analysis of the data was conducted using 
Stata software.  
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4.5. Variable measurement 
This section explains the operationalization of the variables used in the study i.e., 
board structure, intellectual capital, cost of capital, firm performance, and control 
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4.5.1. Exogenous / Independent variable  
As mentioned earlier in the study that seven variables are used to measure board 
structure (board size, board independence, CEO duality, audit committee, gender 
diversity, board background and skill diversity, and board meeting). 
Board size is measured by the total number of board members serving on the 
board of directors (Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994; Williams, 2003; Appuhami & 
Bhuyan, 2015). Board independence is measured by the number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of board members (Morellec et al., 2012). CEO duality is 
measured using a dummy variable, where it takes 1 if CEO duality exists and 0 otherwise 
(Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). Existing literature accepts the usage of the dummy variable 
for CEO duality (Jackling & Johl, 2009). The audit committee is measured by the number 
of independent directors divided by the total number of members in the audit committee 
(Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). Gender diversity is measured by the number of female 
directors divided by the total number of board members (Christiansen et al., 2016; 
Gordini & Rancati, 2017). Board background and skill diversity are measured by the 
number of board members with either industrial-specific or financial background divided 
by the total board members (Girbina et al., 2012; Darmadi, 2013). Finally, the board 
meeting is measured by the number of meetings held in a year (Jackling & Johl, 2009; 
Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). 
4.5.2. Endogenous / Dependent variables  
There are three endogenous variables used in this study i.e., intellectual capital, 
cost of capital, and firm performance. 
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There are many models developed for the measurement of intellectual capital 
(Ulam et al, 2014) such as balanced scorecard by Robert Kaplan and David Norton, 
intellectual capital index by Goran Roos, Skandia navigator by Lief and Michael, value-
added intellectual coefficient by Pulic, and extended value-added intellectual capital 
coefficient by Jamal & Irene. Each valuation model has advantages and disadvantages 
and there is no agreement among the scholars for the suitable valuation model of 
intellectual capital (Sydler et al., 2014). 
However, to measure intellectual capital, this study uses the Value-Added 
Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC) model which was developed by Pulic. VAIC model 
measures the added value depending on intellectual resources. A higher value of VAIC 
for a firm shows greater intellectual capital associated with firms’ resources (Pulic, 
1998). The VAIC model has been used widely in the intellectual capital field as found 
earlier in chapter two (Williams, 2003; N-P Swartz & Firer, 2005; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 
2012; Rahman, 2012; Morariu, 2014 Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). Besides, Volkov 
(2012) found that the VAIC model has been cited by 2373 studies and used in 46 studies. 
VAIC model has five main advantages (Firer & Williams, 2003; Goh, 2005; 
Laing et al., 2010); (1) VAIC model can be used by the firm itself to examine its 
performance associated with intellectual capital (2) unlike other models which require 
financial, non-financial information and subjective judgment, VAIC does not require 
such information which makes comparison across companies easier (3) VAIC model 
relies on audited financial statement data which is verifiable and can be relied upon (4) 
VAIC model is easy and simple to apply to calculate intellectual capital (5) VAIC model 
uses data that is feasible and publicly available which can be retrieved directly from the 
audited financial statement. 
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Similarly, scholars have criticized the VAIC model (Chang, 2007; Mehralian et 
al., 2012; Ulam et al., 2014). Chang (2007) argued that the VAIC model ignores 
intellectual property and research and development expenditure related to profitability 
and firms’ market value. Similarly, Ulam et al., (2014) argued that the VAIC model does 
not include any measurement for relational capital though it mentions there are three 
components of intellectual capital (human, structural and relational capital efficiency). He 
added that relational capital is the main factor in today’s competitive environment that 
affects firms’ value. Mehralian et al., (2012) added that VAIC is a less future-oriented 
technique because it ignores company risk and the negative value-added by the 
companies.  
However, depending on three criteria, the VAIC model has been selected for this 
study. First, the measure of intellectual capital should be made simple to help 
understanding and ease in data collection. This can be justified for cost/benefit reasons. 
Second, using a complicated model will increase the risk of ambiguity which will reduce 
understandability. Finally, based on the study of Volkov (2012) and prior studies 
examining board structure and intellectual capital, this study measures intellectual capital 
by VAIC model and is measured as follows: 
Equation 1: VAit = OPit + ECit + Dit + Ait  
VAit: value-added by resources of firm i at year t 
OPit: operating profit of firm i at year t  
ECit: employee cost of firm i at year t  
 Dit: depreciation of firm i at year t 
Ait: amortization of firm i at year t 
Equation 2:  
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CEEit: VAit / CEit 
HCEit: VAit / HCit 
SCEit: SCit/ VAit 
CEit: book value of the net asset of firm i at year t 
HCit: total salary and wages of firm i at year t 
SCit: VAit - HCit 
CEEit: Capital employed efficiency for firm i at year t / contribution by every unit of a 
physical asset to VA 
HCEit: Human capital efficiency for firm i at year t / contribution by every unit of money 
invested in HC to VA 
SCEit: Structural capital efficiency for firm i at year t / contribution by every unit of 
money invested in SC to VA 
Equation 3: 
VAICit = CEEit + HECit + SCEit   
VAICit: Intellectual capital coefficient for firm i at year t 
Cost of capital is measured in terms of cost of debt (Xuan et al., 2014), cost of 
equity (Pled & Latridis, 2012; Mohamed & Faouzi, 2014) and weighted average cost of 
capital (Pham et al., 2012; Bozec & Bozec; 2011). The cost of capital which includes 
debt and equity is the return required by the finance suppliers as compensation for their 
contribution of capital to the firm. The cost of debt is the money paid by the company as 
a cost for its debt. On the other hand, equity cost is the required return by shareholders for 
investment and ownership risk. It is calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). WACC is expected return on a portfolio for the firm securities i.e., equity and 
debt. It is calculated once the cost of debt and equity is calculated. This study 
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operationalizes the cost of the capital variable by cost of equity, cost of debt, and WACC 
and is measured as follows: 
Cost of equity = risk free rate + beta x risk premium 
Cost of debt = (total interest incurred/ total debt) x 100 
WACC = After- tax weighted cost of debt + weighted cost of equity 
Measures of performance used in literature fit into both market-based and 
accounting-based measures (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). A meta-analytic review of 
corporate governance literature showed no reliability in measures of performance (Dalton 
et al., 1998). 
 This study measures firm performance using accounting-based measures (ROE 
and ROA) and market-based measures (TOBINQ). ROA provides a sign of how the firm 
uses and manages its resources in generating profit. In other words, it helps to estimate 
the efficiency of assets and shows the earnings made by the investment in capital assets. 
Since management is responsible for managing a firm’s assets, ROA provides a sign of 
how the corporate governance system is working to secure and motivate the management. 
Studies have used ROA to measure firm performance (Adler, 2001; Lenard et al., 2014). 
Similarly, ROE is another accounting-based measure that shows the efficiency of the 
company to generate income for every unit of owner’s equity. Prior studies have used 
ROE to measure performance and to examine the impact of intellectual capital (Huang & 
Liu, 2005; Morariu, 2014).  
Market-based measure i.e., TOBINQ indicates the expected firm performance 
(Terjesen et al., 2016). The value of TOBINQ more than one signifies that the market 
believes the value of the firm to be more than the current book value. Besides, when the 
value of TOBINQ is less than one market will expect share will lose value (Terjsen et al., 
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2016). Similarly, prior studies used TOBINQ when measuring firm performance (Gordini 
& Rancati, 2017; Jubliee et al., 2018; Abdelzaher & Abdelzaher, 2019). In the area of 
corporate governance, a low value of TOBINQ signals less effective governance 
mechanisms with managerial discretion, and a high TOBINQ signals an effective 
governance mechanism with managers and shareholders interest aligned (Weir et al., 
2002). 
ROA = Net income / average total assets 
ROE = Net income / average total equity 
Tobin-Q = (total market value equity + total liabilities) / (total equity + total 
liabilities) 
4.5.3. Control variables 
Control variables isolate the effect of controlled proxies in examining the 
association between dependent-independent variables when performing regression. This 
study uses three control variables at the firm level i.e., firm leverage, firm size, and firm 
age. 
Control variables selected in this study are based on intellectual capital and 
corporate governance studies (Ho & Williams, 2003; Jing et al, 2008). Firms might use 
debt to invest in intellectual capital because lenders will view intellectual capital as 
positive that will be returned; thus, leverage is chosen (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). 
Increasing the efficiency of intellectual capital by using leverage will lower capital costs 
and enhance performance.  
Due to financial solvency, large firms may easily invest in intellectual capital, 
therefore, firm size is controlled. When firms are large, they can easily get critical 
resources to improve intellectual capital through which the cost of capital decreases and 
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performance increases. Amato & Burson (2007) examined profit and firm size 
relationships for the financial service sector and found a negative influence of size on 
profitability using a linear form of relationship. In contrast, Akinyomi & Olagunju (2013) 
used panel data from 2005 to 2012 for the Nigerian manufacturing sector to examine the 
effect of firm size on ROA. They used leverage, liquidity and inventory as control 
variables. The results showed that firm size measured as the total asset-total sale is related 
to ROA positively and negatively with leverage. 
Finally, firm age is another control variable chosen because older firms are more 
likely to have higher market value i.e., intellectual capital efficiency. Thus, finance 
suppliers may demand a lower rate of return that may improve the performance of the 
company. In Turkey, Dogan (2013) examined the effect of firm size on 200 companies’ 
profit between 2008 and 2011. With multiple regression, the result revealed that the size 












CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Empirical findings of this study are discussed in this chapter. The chapter is 
divided into ten sections. First, the normality of the data is examined. Next, the path 
analysis model is developed, goodness fit of the model is examined, followed by 
descriptive statistics and correlation test. Then, to achieve the main research objective the 
mediation test of intellectual capital and cost of capital is made along with the total, 
direct, and indirect effect of board structure on firm performance. Finally, six additional 
tests are executed to achieve the secondary objectives of this study. 
5.1. Normality testing 
Skewness and Kurtosis test for normality was performed as shown in Appendix 1. 
The result showed normal distribution only for BIND, AUDITC, COD, and FSIZE 
variables where the p-value was more than 0.05. The data was normalized by removing 
the outliers. As a rule of thumb outliers six standard deviation away from the median 
were removed (Hair et al., 2016).  
5.2. Path analysis 
Developed in the 1920’s path analysis is used to examine casual patterns among 
variables (Stage, Carter & Nora, 2004). To examine the influence associated with 
dependent variables within the path analysis model a series of regression is conducted. 
For the regressions that are made later within the model, dependent variables 
(endogenous variables) act as independent variables (exogenous variables). According to 
Garson (2004), studies in the literature use path analysis to test the correlation matrix fit, 
where it is considered an extension of the regression model. One of the strength of path 
analysis model is that the direct and indirect effect can be simultaneously studied with 
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multiple dependent and independent variables. Also, path analysis aims to provide 
magnitude estimation and significance of casual connection which is hypothesized among 
the set of variables. The hypothesized connections are shown using a path diagram, which 
is an illustration with identified variables. In the diagram, arrows are drawn from one 
variable to another to show causal relationship which is based on theory. 
In addition, path analysis is used to examine the system of equations where all 
variables are observed. It assumes a perfect measurement of the observed variables where 
only the structured relationship among the observed variables is modeled (Stage, Carter 
& Nora, 2004). A path analytic approach is used to test the hypothesized causal path in 
this study between the variables. To estimate the path coefficients and model fit, where 
the estimation is simultaneous, the Maximum Likelihood is used in Stata. In Maximum 
Likelihood, estimation of parameters in the model is calculated at the same time 
repetitively. The path model in this study is hypothesized as shown in figure 5.1. based 
on the conceptual framework discussed earlier in figure 3.1. The path model is shown in 
figure 5.1. which focuses on the direct and indirect effect of board structure on firm 
performance. Thus, to examine the indirect effect, board structure variables are connected 
to intellectual capital, intellectual capital to cost of capital and cost of capital to firm 
performance. To examine the direct effect, board structure variables are connected to firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, and TOBINQ). Before interpreting path coefficients, the 














5.3. Goodness fit of the model 
The overall fitness of the model is tested using chi-square where the model gets 
rejected if the p-value is less than 0.05. Three major indices used in research to test the 
overall goodness of the model are RMSEA, CFI, and TLI (Steiger, 1990; Bentler & 
Bonett, 1980). RMSEA assesses the gap between the hypothesized model and the perfect 
model whereas CFI and TLI compare the fit of the hypothesized model with the baseline 
model. Hu & Bentler (1999) suggested CFI and TLI > 0.95 and RMSEA < 0.06 indicates 
in general a good fit for models using maximum likelihood estimation. Their 
recommendation became highly influential and the cutoff values have been applied in 
structural equation modeling practices. 
Table 5.1. shows the overall goodness fit of the path analysis model. The p-value 
is 0.193 not significant, thus our model is accepted. RMSEA is 0.014 which is less than 
0.06 and CFI and TLI are 0.968 and 0.996 greater than 0.95. Thus, the model shows a 




Table 5. 1. Overall goodness-of-fitness statistic 
Fit statistic Value 
Likelihood ratio 
 chi2 15.133 
P > chi2 0.193 
Population error 
 





Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.968 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.996 
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5.4. Descriptive statistics 
General understanding of the sample and the preliminary information useful in 
proceeding with regression analysis is provided by descriptive statistics (Table 5.2). The 
board size of the NZX50 companies ranges from 4 to 16 directors on board with an 
average of 7 directors, suggesting that NZX50 companies have enough directors. The 
firms met the New Zealand listing requirement that there should be at least three 
directors. The average number of directors (6.9) from 2010 to 2019 is consistent with the 
number of directors (6.23) found by Bhuiyan et al., (2013) in 2010. Also, 72.86% of the 
board directors are independent which satisfies the listing rule 3.3.1 of New Zealand. 
However, some firms had board independence of 17.65% which is less than the required 
independent directors, but because New Zealand applies the principle-based approach, 
firms can provide valid justification. Meetings per year are around 10 on average which 
represents meeting every 36 days. Since, the board conducts frequent meetings, the 
decision-making process along with strategic decisions reflects firms’ profit and earnings. 
Similarly, although CEO duality is limited in New Zealand, some firms had CEO duality 
representing an average of 0.05. The proportion of female directors is 21.89% on average 
ranging from 0% to 66.67%. This represents that female participation on the board is still 
low. Similarly, the proportion of directors having financial or industrial experience is on 
an average of 35.5% which is less than 50%. This represents a major concern for most of 
the companies where directors suffer a lack of industry-specific knowledge or financial 
background. This is supported by the argument of Bhuiyan & Roudaki (2013) who argues 
that with the presence of board interlocking firms in New Zealand suffer to find a suitable 
independent expert director. Thus, due to board interlocking a director may lack financial 
background or experience/knowledge of one specific industry in detail. Finally, 84.74% 
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of audit committee members are independent which satisfies the listing rules and 
governance code of New Zealand. 
Regarding endogenous variables, NZX50 companies have created on average 6.29 
intellectual capital i.e., average total value efficiency created by the companies using the 
resources employed is 6.29. The better the resources utilized by the company, the higher 
will be the value creation. The intellectual capital efficiency of NZX50 companies ranges 
from -3.96 to 156.37. Also, the average cost of debt and equity is 3.36% and 11.66% 
respectively. This represents an appropriate justification where the risk and return of debt 
are less compared to equity, thus less cost of debt compared to equity. The overall cost of 
financing ranges from 1.22% to 19.04% with an average of 8.08%. 
The average ROA is 7.33% and ROE is 12.81%. ROE is more than ROA by 
5.48%, which indicates NZX50 companies have good performance when comparing 
return with the cost of equity and cost of debt. Similarly, Tobin-q ranges from 0.59 to 
19.39 with an average of 1.67 which indicates that stock is overvalued. 
Finally, the average age of the firms selected is 3 years with the oldest firm 
established 5 years ago, and the latest firm established around 3 years ago. The average 
firm leverage is 41.8% ranging from 0.02% to 153.37%. The average firm size is 6.27 








Table 5. 2. Descriptive statistics 













BIND 391 .7286846 .2062243 .1765 1 
BMEET 391 10.1878 3.3836 5 33 
CEOD 391 .0512195 .2207145 0 1 
GEND 391 .2188715 .1431424 0 .6667 
BBS 391 .3554832 .2099978 0 .9832 
AUDITC 391 .8473751 .20037 .11 1 
Endogenous variables:      
IC 391 6.291093 17.42386 -3.962984 156.3709 
COD 391 .0336665 .015868 0 .0825 
COE 391 .1166227 .3482652 .0149 0.0713 
WACC 391 .0808046 .0256803 .0122 .1904 
ROA 391 .0733302 .0691721 -.5232 .4863 
ROE 391 .1281022 .1178406 -.8842 .6941 
Tobin-q 391 1.66867 1.56905 0.59138 19.39671 
Control variables:      
FAGE 391 3.581845 .6755347 2.833213 5.308268 
FLEV 391 .418 .2431318 .0002 1.5337 








 5.5. Correlation test 
 
Table 5.3 shows the results of the correlation matrix between the variables. In 
regression, two highly correlated variables will result in redundant information. To avoid 
this problem, a correlation test was conducted, which revealed no high correlation among 
variables. There are five categories of correlation coefficients as per Evans (1996): 0.00 - 
0.19 considered as very weak, 0.2 - 0.39 as weak, 0.4 - 0.59 as moderate, 0.6 - 0.79 as 
strong and 0.8 - 1.0 very strong. No variables used in the study fall in the strong and very 




Table 5. 3. Pearson correlation  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. BSIZE 1.0000                 
2. BIND -0.1222 1.0000                
3. BMEET 0.1603 0.1216 1.0000               
4. CEOD 0.0819 -0.0399 -0.0162 1.0000              
5. GEND 0.0161 0.2269 0.1715 -0.0946 1.0000             
6. BBS 0.0884 0.0195 0.0123 -0.0350 -0.0776 1.0000            
7. AUDITC -0.0464 0.5860 -0.0231 -0.0025 0.0454 0.1643 1.0000           
8. IC -0.1224 0.0131 -0.0312 0.0946 -0.1878 0.0146 0.1308 1.0000          
9. COD -0.0500 -0.1963 0.1157 0.0693 -0.3028 0.0517 -0.1945 0.1781 1.0000         
10. COE -0.0125 0.0294 -0.0124 -0.0013 -0.0798 -0.0113 -0.0392 -0.0269 0.0521 1.0000        
11. WACC -0.0245 -0.0923 -0.0689 0.1734 -0.1069 -0.0687 -0.0002 -0.0780 0.1896 0.0295 1.0000       
12. ROA -0.1495 -0.0230 0.0305 -0.0662 0.0020 -0.0955 -0.1174 0.0304 -0.0933 -0.1322 0.1651 1.0000      
13. ROE -0.0248 -0.0232 0.0243 -0.0670 0.0980 -0.0654 -0.1116 -0.0480 -0.1902 -0.1753 0.0837 0.9003 1.0000     
14. Tobin-q -0.1165 0.0203 -0.0916 0.0048 -0.0263 -0.1337 0.0250 -0.0386 -0.3362 -0.0148 0.3417 0.5735 0.4485 1.0000    
15. FAGE 0.0619 -0.0529 -0.0151 0.0876 0.0398 -0.0311 0.0001 0.0185 -0.0421 -0.0274 0.1007 0.0217 0.0260 0.0496 1.0000   
16. FLEV -0.0569 -0.0972 0.0080 -0.0022 -0.0211 -0.0514 -0.1361 -0.0595 0.2044 0.0867 0.0759 0.1005 0.0765 0.0308 0.0134 1.0000  
17. FSIZE 0.4537 0.2277 0.1346 -0.0326 0.2470 0.2398 0.1373 -0.0658 -0.1770 0.0008 -0.3379 -0.3221 -0.1189 -0.3260 -0.0080 -0.2428 1.0000 
Note: Numbers 1 to 17 on the top represent the variables as mentioned in the first left-side column of the table 
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5.6. Board structure and firm performance with the mediating effect of intellectual 
capital 
To assess the model to be used in this study (panel data), literature has provided 
two main popular and useful models i.e., fixed, and random effect models. Hausman 
test and Breusch and Pagan LM test are conducted to choose the appropriate model. 
Hausman test provides a clear idea of whether to use a fixed or random-effect 
model. The null hypothesis is that random effect is an appropriate and alternative 
hypothesis that the fixed effect model is appropriate. If the p-value is less than 0.05 we 
reject the null hypothesis and use the fixed effect model. 
Similarly, Breusch and Pagan LM test provides an additional test of whether to 
use a random effect model or pooled regression model. The null hypothesis is that 
pooled regression is an appropriate and alternative hypothesis that the random effect 
model is appropriate. 
To choose the appropriate model in this section, we run the Hausman test as 
shown in Appendix 2 and we rejected our null hypothesis. Thus, the below fixed effect 
model is used to examine board structure and firm performance with the mediating 
effect of intellectual capital to achieve research objective (1) and answer the main 
research question: 
Firm performance it = αit  β1 (BSIZE)it  β2 (BIND)it  β3 (CEOD)it  β4 
(AUDITC)it  β5 (GEND)it  β6 (BBS)it + β7 (BMEET)it + β8 (BSIZE*IC)it  β9 
(BIND*IC)it  β10 (CEOD*IC)it  β11 (AUDITC*IC)it  β12 (GEND*IC)it + β13 
(BBS*IC)it + β14 (BMEET*IC)it + β15 (FSIZE)it  β16 (FLEV)it  β17 (FAGE)it  β18 
(CLUSTER)it  β19 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
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Where firm performance = ROA, ROE, TOBINQ, i is the company, t is the time 
and ↋ is the error term. 
. ROA model had adjusted R2 of 29.78% i.e., 29.78% of the variation in the 
performance is justified and explained by the independent variables in the model. 
70.22% of the variation is not explained by the model. Similarly, ROE and TOBINQ 
models had adjusted R2 of 20.3% and 43.31% respectively. This test is carried out to 
check if intellectual capital enhances the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance. 
With the mediating effect of intellectual capital, only board independence 
showed a stronger association with ROA at 5% as shown in Table 5.4. Thus, we accept 
the H2a hypothesis which indicates that intellectual capital mediates the relationship 
between board independence and firm performance. Also, audit committee composition 
and board meetings that were significant before the mediating effect became 
insignificant with the addition of the mediating effect of intellectual capital. We can say 
that even though firms have intellectual capital efficiency it is important to manage and 
utilize the resources efficiently to positively impact performance. Resource-dependency 
theory supports the argument, where it explains that acquisition, management, and 
reliance of firms on the acquired resource is the role of the board. Besides, the resource-
based view theory adds that firms should use existing resources within the firm to take 
advantage of external opportunities. Thus, the way of how the board of directors uses or 
motivates management to utilize intellectual capital efficiency matters more than just 
having intellectual capital efficiency. The result found contradicts the study of 
Nkundabanyanga (2014) and Hamdan et al., (2017). The contradicting result might be 
because of the way in examining the intellectual capital variable. Prior studies 
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(Nkundabanyanga, 2014; Hamdan et al., 2017) have examined the effect of intellectual 
capital components as mediating variables and found only a few variables to be 
significant while this study examined intellectual capital without breaking it into 
components. Therefore, we reject H1a, H3a, H4a, H5a, H6a and H7a hypothesis where 
it is found that intellectual capital does not mediate the relationship between board 
structure (board size, CEO duality, audit committee composition, gender diversity, 




Table 5. 4. Fixed effect regression analysis: board structure and firm performance with 
mediating effect of intellectual capital 






















































































Table 5.4. Fixed effect regression analysis: board structure and firm performance with 
mediating effect of intellectual capital (Continued) 

























































R2 0.3128 0.215 0.4724 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.2978 0.203 0.4331 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  Significant at 





5.7. Board structure and firm performance with mediating effect of cost of capital 
To choose the right model, we run the Hausman test as shown in Appendix 3 
and we accepted our null hypothesis (random model is appropriate). The below random 
effect model is used to examine board structure and firm performance with mediating 
effect of cost of capital to achieve research objective (2) and answer the main research 
question: 
Firm performance it = αit  β1 (BSIZE)it  β2 (BIND)it  β3 (CEOD)it  β4 
(AUDITC)it  β5 (GEND)it  β6 (BBS)it + β7 (BMEET)it + β8 (BSIZE*WACC)it  β9 
(BIND*WACC)it  β10 (CEOD*WACC)it  β11 (AUDITC*WACC)it  β12 
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(GEND*WACC)it + β13 (BBS*WACC)it + β14 (BMEET*WACC)it + β15 (FSIZE)it  β16 
(FLEV)it  β17 (FAGE)it + β18 (CLUSTER)it  β19 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
Firm performance it = αit  β1 (BSIZE)it  β2 (BIND)it  β3 (CEOD)it  β4 
(AUDITC)it  β5 (GEND)it  β6 (BBS)it + β7 (BMEET)it + β8 (BSIZE*COE)it  β9 
(BIND*COE)it  β10 (CEOD*COE)it  β11 (AUDITC*COE)it  β12 (GEND*COE)it + 
β13 (BBS*COE)it + β14 (BMEET*COE)it + β15 (FSIZE)it  β16 (FLEV)it  β17 (FAGE)it  
β18 (CLUSTER)it  β19 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
Firm performance it = αit  β1 (BSIZE)it  β2 (BIND)it  β3 (CEOD)it  β4 
(AUDITC)it  β5 (GEND)it  β6 (BBS)it + β7 (BMEET)it + β8 (BSIZE*COD)it  β9 
(BIND*COD)it  β10 (CEOD*COD)it  β11 (AUDITC*COD)it  β12 (GEND*COD)it + 
β13 (BBS*COD)it + β14 (BMEET*COD)it + β15 (FSIZE)it  β16 (FLEV)it  β17 (FAGE)it 
 β18 (CLUSTER)it  β19 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
Where firm performance = ROA, ROE, TOBINQ, i is the company, t is the time 
and ↋ is the error term. 
Focusing on WACC, 39.35% of the variation in ROE is justified and explained 
by the independent variable. TOBINQ had adjusted R2 of 29.14% and ROA 21.38%. 
The size of the board showed a positive association at 1% with firm performance. 
However, with the mediating effect of WACC, performance decreased with a larger 
size of the board (Butt & Hasan, 2009; Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Hajjha et al., 2013). This 
shows that, board size can improve firm performance if firms enjoy lower external 
financing costs. Similarly, board independence and audit committee composition 
showed a negative association with performance and positive relation after the 
mediating effect of WACC. The result supports the finding of Pham, Suschard, Zein 
93  
(2011), where monitoring mechanism of independent directors/members increases with 
external financing cost which positively affects performance and may help to lower 
capital cost. On the other hand, board background and skill diversity lower firm 
performance with the mediating effect of WACC i.e., the directors in New Zealand may 
not have the required knowledge to deal with external financing cost which negatively 
affects performance. The board lacks a fast and in-depth assessment of decision making 
which increases the information asymmetry between the board and other stakeholders. 
Board background and skill diversity also showed a negative association with 
performance in the below discussed results. Prior literature studied in New Zealand 
supports our argument where a negative association was found between educational 
level and performance Bathula (2008). Also, the mediating effect of WACC showed a 
positive relation of board meeting with TOBINQ at 10%. This shows that with external 
financing cost, board meeting increases to discuss issues related to the best usage of 
capital. This may help to develop strategic actions or to optimize a firm’s capital 
structure which positively impacts firm value increasing TOBINQ. Finally, among 
control variables larger firms showed lower firm performance. We can say that firms 
with high total assets are unable to use economies of scale or has incapable 
management to use these assets to positively influence firm performance. In other 
words, large firms have come under the control of managers that pursue self-interest 
rather than profit-maximizing objective for the firm that negatively affects 
performance. The result agrees with the study of Amato & Burson (2007) and 
contradicts Dogan (2013). 
Focusing on COE, 25.12% of the variation in TOBINQ is justified and 
explained by independent variables. ROA had adjusted R2 of 19.88 % and ROE 11.14 
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%. Board size, board independence, and audit committee composition showed similar 
results as the mediating effect of WACC. However, CEO duality showed a negative 
association with ROE with the mediating effect of COE. This confirms that whenever 
CEO duality exists, the board does not work effectively where corporate governance is 
regarded as weak, and the cost of equity increases which negatively affects 
performance (Bliss, 2011). Also, gender diversity improves performance with the 
mediating effect of COE i.e., finance suppliers reduce the cost of capital with the 
presence of female directors due to their effective monitoring and advising capability 
which positively impacts performance. Usman, Farooq, Zhang, Makki & Khan (2019) 
supports the argument made where it was found that information asymmetry and 
opportunistic behavior reduces with the presence of a female on board. Contradicting 
with the mediating effect of WACC, board meetings showed a negative association 
with performance supporting the study of Rodriguez-Fernandez (2014). Higher board 
meetings lower firm performance with the effect of cost of equity where the negative 
association may be due to the time lag effect as time is required to exercise the ideas 
discussed in the meeting (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). Also, a possible explanation 
would be that the quality of the meeting matters more than the frequency of the 
meeting. Finally, among control variables, firm age showed a positive relationship with 
performance where older firms along with their experience and good corporate 
governance positively influence performance compared to new firms. Similarly, firm 
size showed the same relationship as discussed above. 
Finally, discussing COD, similar results are found as discussed above. Board 
size, CEO duality, board background and skill, and board meeting showed a negative 
association with firm performance with mediating effect of debt cost. Independence of 
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the board and audit committee composition showed a positive relation. Also, firm size 
showed a negative association, and firm leverage positive association with firm 
performance. From the above discussion of the results, we: - 
1. Accept the H1b hypothesis under WACC, COE, and COD model where the cost 
of capital negatively mediated the relationship between board size and firm 
performance.  
2. Reject H2b hypothesis under WACC, COE, and COD model where the cost of 
capital positively mediated the relationship between board independence and 
firm performance 
3. Accept the H3b hypothesis under the COE and COD model, where the cost of 
capital negatively mediated the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance and reject H3b hypothesis under the WACC model as no mediation 
effect found. 
4. Reject H4b hypothesis under WACC, COE, and COD model where the cost of 
capital positively mediated the relationship between audit committee 
composition and firm performance. 
5. Reject H5b hypothesis under the COE model where the cost of capital positively 
mediated the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance and 
reject H5b hypothesis under the WACC and COD model as no mediation effect 
found. 
6. Accept the H6b hypothesis under WACC and COD model, where the cost of 
capital negatively mediated relationship between board background and skill 
diversity and firm performance and reject H6b hypothesis under the COE model 
as no mediation effect found. 
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7.  Reject H7b hypothesis under the WACC model where cost of capital positively 
mediated relationship between board meeting and firm performance and accept 
H7b hypothesis under COE and COD model where the cost of capital negatively 




Table 5. 5. Random effect regression analysis: board structure and firm performance 
with mediating effect of cost of capital  




















































































































Table 5.5. Random effect regression analysis: board structure and firm performance 
with mediating effect of cost of capital - (Continued) 





























R2 0.2456 0.401 0.3212 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.2138 0.3935 0.2914 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  Significant 




























































































Table 5. 5. Random effect regression analysis: board structure and firm performance 
with mediating effect of cost of capital – (Continued) 

























































R2 0.2132 0.1385 0.2752 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1988 0.1114 0.2512 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  Significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 




























































Table 5.5. Random effect regression analysis: board structure and firm performance 
with mediating effect of cost of capital – (Continued) 





















































































R2 0.2451 0.2011 0.3519 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.2239 0.1649 0.330 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  Significant 

















5.8. A direct and indirect effect of board structure and firm performance 
After testing the mediating effect of intellectual capital and cost of capital 
separately, now we compare the direct effect of board structure on firm performance 
with the indirect effect of board structure on firm performance through intellectual 
capital and cost of capital to achieve research objective (3) and answer the main 
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research question. We used the postestimation tool in Stata, decomposition of effects 




Table 5. 6. Direct, indirect, and total effect of board structure and firm performance  
  BSIZE BIND CEOD AUDITC GEND BBS BMEET 
ROA 

























































































































































Focusing on ROA, the total effect between the size of the board and ROA is 
significant at 5% with β=0.04. When we control the indirect effect, the association 
between the size of the board and performance becomes insignificant with β=0.01. The 
difference we see between the value of β is the indirect effect where β=0.03. This 
indicates that the association between board structure and performance is enhanced by 
intellectual capital and capital cost. Similarly, other board structure variables show the 
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same mechanism as discussed above. Only gender diversity revealed a direct positive 
effect on ROA, but when mediated through intellectual capital and capital cost, gender 
diversity negatively impacts firm performance. This can be argued that gender diversity 
cannot take complex decisions in terms of capital structure or influence the cost of 
capital of the firm. This can be described in the sense that, gender diversity positively 
impacts intellectual capital (Table 5.9) but when mediated through the cost of capital 
they negatively impact firm performance. This is also supported by our additional test 
result (Table 5.10) where gender diversity negatively impacted the cost of capital. 
Focusing on ROE and TOBINQ, we find a similar result as ROA where the 
relationship between board structure and firm performance is improved by intellectual 
capital and capital cost except for gender diversity. Also, we see the significance level 
for some variables becomes stronger with the indirect effect compared to the direct 
effect. 
The result of this study confirms that the total effect on performance is 
improved by the structure of the board, intellectual capital, and capital cost which is in 
line with the agency, resource-based view, and resource dependency theories. It is also 
in line with the argument of Keenam & Aggestam (2001) that managerial decision-
making enhances the value of shareholders by capital while corporate governance uses 
intellectual capital to create value. If the board does not focus on intellectual capital it 
would be a failure of board governance that can affect performance. This study also 
challenges the criticisms made that board structure does not perform well when the firm 
performance is poor. This is because intellectual capital and cost of capital contribute 
towards the impact of firm performance and not only the board. Finally, findings of 
prior studies where no relationship was found between board structure and firm 
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performance (Haslindar & Fazilah, 2011) might be because of ignoring the fact to 
examine intellectual capital and capital cost variables. 
To conclude from the test performed in section 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8, it is noticed that 
board structure and firm performance was not mediated much by intellectual capital 
(Table 5.4) compared to the mediation effect by the cost of capital. But when the 
indirect effect of board structure on firm performance is examined through intellectual 
capital and cost of capital, the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance is enhanced in a better way compared to the separate mediation effect test 
and the direct effect test. Thus, we conclude and answer the main research question in 
the study by saying that yes, the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance is mediated by intellectual capital and cost of capital i.e., a good board 
structure will be able to increase intellectual capital efficiency, thereby reducing the 
cost of capital implying increased firm performance. 
5.9. Path analysis model estimation 
After using the postestimation tool to estimate direct, indirect, and total effect, 
now the entire path analysis model (Figure 5.1) is estimated. Based on the Maximum 
Likelihood estimation of the path analysis model, regression output was formulated as 
shown in Table 5.7 which help to achieve secondary objective number 1, 2, 5, and 6 of 
this study. 
Hypothesis H1c and H1d are accepted, where board size is significantly 
positively related to intellectual capital and firm performance. Large board size signals 
increased access to resources (such as new raw material, new market, and technology), 
knowledge, and expertise of the board of directors which positively impacts intellectual 
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capital. The large board has a higher opportunity to have directors with industry 
experience and a high educational level which helps to provide high-quality advice to 
management. The service role of the director is to improve company reputation, serve 
as advisors to executives, and establish contact with externals (Pfeffer & Salancick, 
1978). Therefore, from a resource-based view theory perspective, the large board are in 
a better position to utilize their knowledge and expertise. This helps to create effective 
relation with externals and secure resources for the organizational operation which 
improves firms’ intellectual capital. Also, from an agency theory perspective, they act 
as effective monitoring for management. This helps to reduce agency cost and improve 
performance. The result is in line with (Zahra, 1989; Jackling & Johl, 2009).  
We accept our hypothesis H2c and H2d, where board independence is 
significantly positively associated with intellectual capital and firm performance. 
However, the result contradicts the study of Agrawal & Knoeber (1996); Barhart & 
Rosenstein (1998), and Kiel & Nicholson (2003). Independent directors prefer to show 
to the board that they are performing well so they are more conducive towards the goal, 
mission, and strategy of the organization. Also, they come with a different background 
from different organizations bringing more knowledge and skill compared to inside 
directors who are vested only within their working place. Independent directors provide 
up-to-date operational information to the board, provide a better decision-making basis. 
This help to protect firms from the external environment by reducing uncertainty, 
suggest resources that can increase firms’ recognition and status, exchange information, 
and represent the firm to stakeholders. Thus, they enhance firms’ intellectual capital 
and performance.  
We partially accept hypothesis H3c and H3d, where CEO duality is negatively 
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associated with intellectual capital and firm performance but is not significant. CEO 
duality control board meetings and put self-interest ahead (Boivie et al., 2011). This 
opportunistic behavior of the CEO suggests that CEO duality uses organizational 
resources for their welfare to increase status and prestige without making effective 
intellectual capital decisions. Thus, from an agency theory perspective, CEO duality 
avoids efficient and effective intellectual capital decisions and reduces the value of 
shareholders. 
We accept hypothesis H4c and H4d, where audit committee composition is 
significantly positively associated with intellectual capital and firm performance. Result 
found is in line with the study of Collier (2001); Chan & Li (2008) and Saibaba & 
Ansari (2013). An independent audit committee helps the board in decision-making 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Due to the high proportion of independent directors in the audit 
committee, the monitoring function increases, the internal control process gets 
enhanced, and the information asymmetry gets reduced (Keenan & Aggestam, 2001; 
Jing et al., 2008). Thus, the establishment of an audit committee ensures the 
opportunistic behavior is controlled and the organizational resources are used 
efficiently for an effective investment in intellectual capital to increase shareholders’ 
value. From the resource dependency theory perspective, the audit committee is 
regarded as a bundle of resources and knowledge because the majority of independent 
members in the audit committee are with diverse skills and knowledge. An audit 
committee works closely with the board and communicates issues relating to internal 
controls, financial reporting, provide an overview of ethics and compliance, risk 
management. This helps the board of directors to gain information and ideas from 
independent members in the audit committee.  
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We reject hypothesis H5c, where gender diversity is negatively associated with 
firm performance (TOBINQ). On the other hand, we accept hypothesis H5d, where 
gender diversity is significantly positively associated with intellectual capital. From the 
resource-dependency theory perspective, gender diversity relies upon the perspectives, 
experience, problem-solving approaches, and social network relation that they bring to 
the board. Thus, females on the board efficiently invest in intellectual capital. The result 
is consistent with the findings of Provan, (1980); Kesner, (1988) and Mitchell Williams 
(2000).  
We partially accept our hypothesis H6c and H6d, where board background and 
skill diversity are positively related to intellectual capital and firm performance but are 
not significant. Board members with background and skill diversity provide a mixture 
of capabilities and competencies for the firm which provides a different perspective in 
decision-making. Qualified board member provides knowledge base environment that 
enhances a thoughtful process to solve problems and provide innovative ideas to 
develop policies. Also, boards with a higher educational qualification are more likely to 
be flexible, have a better ability to accept innovation and adopt new ideas and have 
greater capabilities to process information. These characteristics of board members help 
them to create policies and strategies on how to best utilize, obtain, and enhance 
intellectual capital efficiency.  
We accept our hypothesis H7c and H7d, where board meeting is significantly 
positively related to intellectual capital and firm performance (Ntim & Osei, 2011; 
Francis, 2012). Due to increased board meetings, intellectual capital performance 
increases since innovation increases the stake of intangible and facilitates intellectual 
capital development (Marques et al., 2006). The resource dependency theory 
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perspective argued that board meetings help to convey up-to-date information among 
the directors which positively contributes to acquire relevant resources to improve 
intellectual capital. Also, the knowledge shared in the board meeting helps to generate 
innovative ideas, policy, and strategy that enhances intellectual capital.  
With regards to WACC, we partially accept hypothesis H9 where there is an 
insignificant negative association between intellectual capital and WACC. With regards 
to COE, we accept hypothesis H9 where a significant negative association is found 
between intellectual capital and COE. Finally, in terms of COD, we reject hypothesis 
H9 where a significant positive relation is found between intellectual capital and COD. 
The results indicate that shareholders in New Zealand value the firm more than 
creditors when assessing the cost of capital. Creditors focus on intellectual capital 
disclosure as opposed to intellectual capital efficiency as disused in prior literature 
(Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Orens et al., 2010). Besides, the cost of debt depends more on 
the economic condition of the country compared to intellectual capital efficiency. Even 
though intellectual capital efficiency is high, the economic situation in the country may 
not be stable due to which interest rate increases and thereby the cost of debt. 
Therefore, high intellectual capital efficiency increases firms’ value and decreases the 
required return by shareholders and increases the required return by creditors.  
Finally, we accept hypothesis H10 where a negative association is found 
between the cost of capital and firm performance. A low cost of capital implies more 
capital is retained within the business which can be utilized for growth. Thus, the low 
cost of capital implies higher firm performance. This result contradicts the findings of 
Reverte, (2011); Pouraghajan, et al. (2012), Wu et al. (2012). 
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Table 5. 7. Path analysis model estimation  
ROA  ROE  TOBINQ  
 




























































































































































    





5.10. Additional tests 
To achieve secondary objectives of the study, six tests have been performed to 
check if a similar result is found in the prior literature. Secondary research objectives 
1,2,5, and 6 have been achieved in section 5.9 by using the path analysis estimation. 
However, in this section, we run the fixed/random regression model to re-confirm the 
results of secondary research objectives 1,2,5, and 6. Also, the secondary research 
objective 3 and 4 are achieved in this section. 
5.10.1. Board structure and firm performance 
To choose the appropriate model, we run the Hausman test as shown in 
Appendix 4 and we rejected our null hypothesis. Thus, the below fixed effect model is 
used to examine board structure and firm performance to achieve secondary research 
objective number 1: 
Firm performance it = αit  β1 (BSIZE)it  β2 (BIND)it  β3 (CEOD)it  β4 
(AUDITC)it  β5 (GEND)it  β6 (BBS)it + β7 (BMEET)it + β8 (FSIZE)it  β9 (FLEV)it  
β10 (FAGE)it  β11 (CLUSTER)it  β12 (INDSUTRY)it + + ↋it 
Where, firm performance = ROA, ROE, TOBINQ, i is the company, t is the 
time and ↋ is the error term. 
ROA, ROE, and TOBINQ fixed model regression results revealed mixed results 
compared to prior literature as shown in Table 5.8. ROA model had adjusted R2 of 
20.7% i.e., 20.7% of the variation in performance is justified and explained by the 
independent variables in the model. 79.3% of the variation is not explained by the 
model. Similarly, ROE and TOBINQ models had adjusted R2 of 18.6% and 19.8% 
respectively. Considering the ROA model only board independence, audit committee 
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composition and firm size were significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Under the 
ROE model, audit committee composition and firm size were significant at 10% and 
1% respectively. Similarly, at 10% significance level, board independence, and board 
meeting and at 1% significance level firm size were significantly related under the 
TOBINQ model. 
Board size under all the three models was positive but insignificant resulting in 
partial acceptance of hypothesis H1c. The result is consistent with the study of De 
Andres et al., (2005) in New Zealand, Connelly & Limpaphyom, (2004) in Thailand 
and Pi & Timme, (1993); Belkhir, (2006) who found the size of the board does not 
impact firm performance. The result is supported by Bhuiyan & Roudaki (2013) who 
argue that with the presence of board interlocking, firms in New Zealand suffer to find 
a suitable independent expert director. Also, board size in New Zealand has decreased 
from 7.5 to 6.95 from 1985 to 2019. Despite the decreasing board size (less knowledge 
and expertise), NZX 50 firms are contributing positively to firm performance but are 
insignificant. 
We accept H2c, where board independence at 1% significance level showed a 
positive relation with ROA and TOBINQ. This indicates that with a high number of 
independent directors the board has more knowledge about the market, new ideas 
which positively impacts firm performance. A high proportion of independent directors 
can help firms to set decisions, balance interest, bring new knowledge to the board, and 
build connections. This helps the firm to use its resources effectively in generating 
profit increasing ROA. Similarly, when the market sees more independent directors on 
board the firm value increases, positively impacting TOBINQ. The result is consistent 
with the study of Reddy et al. (2010), Hossain et al. (2001) where independent directors 
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in New Zealand positively impacted TOBINQ. Also, the result is consistent with Dey, 
A. (2008) who found a positive relation between ROA and board independence for 371 
US firms from 2000 to 2001. On the other hand, the result contradicts the study of 348 
Australian firms by Kiel & Nicholson (2003) who found a negative relation. Result also 
contradicts the study of Barhart & Rosenstein (1998), Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), and 
Kiel & Nicholson (2003). 
Consistent with the study of Kesner (1988), Vafeas & Theodorou (1998), Chen 
et al. (2008) & Iyengar & Zampelli (2009), we partially accept hypothesis H3c, where 
CEO duality is negatively related with firm performance but is not significant. This can 
be argued that because of the low representation of CEO duality in New Zealand, the 
result showed no relationship with performance. Also, t-value coefficients show 
negative sign between CEO duality and firm performance but insignificant (no relation) 
i.e., whenever CEO duality exists it leads to agency problem and shareholders view it 
as lack of good corporate governance due to which firm performance gets negatively 
impacted though it is not significant in this study.  
Like board independence, we accept hypothesis H4c where, audit committee 
composition is positively related to ROA and ROE at 5% and 10% significance level. 
The independent subcommittee improves the internal control process of the 
organization (Jing et al., 2008). The existence of high proportion of independent 
members in the audit committee provides effective internal controls implementation. 
This helps to control resources, provide extensive knowledge, enhance corporate 
governance, and help firms to use resources efficiently to generate profit. Thus, audit 
committee positively impact ROA and ROE. The result is in line with the study of 200 
fortune companies by Chan & Li (2008), Saibaba & Ansari (2013) and (Collier, 2001) 
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who found 63% of 142 UK-based large companies have independent directors in audit 
committee that helps to minimize information asymmetry positively impacting firm 
performance. 
Contradicting with the study of Zahoor (2016) this study found no significant 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. We partially accept 
hypothesis H5c, where gender diversity is positively related but not significant. The 
result is in line with the study of Duppati et al. (2017) in New Zealand, where no 
significant effect of gender diversity was found. We can say that because of the small 
number of females on board in New Zealand, there is no relation between firm 
performance and gender diversity. Besides, examining the ownership effect on firm 
performance in the New Zealand context, Fauzi & Locke (2012) also concluded that 
gender diversity had a low impact on performance. 
Consistent with the study of Murray (1989) we reject hypothesis H6c where 
board background and skill diversity and firm performance are negatively related under 
the TOBINQ model. However, the result contradicts Girbina et al. (2012) and Darmadi 
(2013) who found a positive relation. The discrepancies between the result found and 
prior literature would be because of cultural diversity factors. Different thoughts are 
shared by board members and each director approaches problem-solving in his/her way 
which brings unique cultural knowledge. This can create a problem in terms of 
communication leading to personal problems that affects board commitment, 
effectiveness, and trust. Thus, the cultural diversity represented by the background and 
skill diversity of the board can create a lack of trust between directors with different 
backgrounds but not with the same background. Thus, the study showed no relationship 
between background and skill diversity and performance. 
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We reject hypothesis H7c where board meetings showed a negative relationship 
(Bathula, 2008; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; Ilaboya & Obaretin, 2015) with TOBINQ 
at 10% significance level and no relationship with ROA and ROE. Result found can be 
interpreted in the sense that the number of board meetings does not always lead to 
higher firm performance, but the timely decision implementation and quality of board 
meetings are necessary. 
Finally, among the control variables only firm size was negatively related to 
firm performance at 1% significance level. It can be argued that firms with high total 
assets are unable to use economies of scale or has incapable management to utilize 
these assets to positively influence firm performance. The result agrees with the study 
of Amato & Burson (2007) and contradicts the study of Dogan (2013). Also, it is found 
that firm age is insignificantly positively related, and firm leverage is insignificantly 
negatively related to firm performance. Older firms tend to have more experience, 
knowledge, and value which contributes positively to performance but is insignificant. 
Similarly, when firms have high debt it negatively impacts performance but 
insignificantly. The result is consistent with the studies of Akinyomi & Olagunju 
(2013) & Dogan (2013). 
Comparing the result found in path analysis estimation (Table 5.7) and result 
found here (Table 5.8) we find inconsistent results where board size was associated 
positively with firm performance under path analysis whereas not associated under the 
fixed effect model. Similarly, the board meeting was positively associated with 
performance under path analysis whereas negatively associated under the fixed model. 
Thus, we answer the secondary research question number 1 by saying that there is an 
association between board structure and firm performance based on the results found in 
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Table 5.7 and Table 5.8. However, this association varies depending on the way of 




Table 5. 8. Fixed effect regression analysis: board structure and firm performance 




























































































R2 0.223 0.20 0.219 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.207 0.186 0.198 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  






5.10.2. Board structure and intellectual capital 
To choose the appropriate model, we run the Hausman test as shown in 
Appendix 5 and we accepted our null hypothesis (random model is appropriate). We 
further did Breusch and Pegan LM test, and rejected null hypothesis (pooled regression 
appropriate), confirming that random effect model is appropriate to examine board 
structure and intellectual capital to achieve secondary research objective number 2:  
IC it = αit  β1 (BSIZE)it  β2 (BIND)it  β3 (CEOD)it  β4 (AUDITC)it  β5 
(GEND)it  β6 (BBS)it + β7 (BMEET)it + β8 (FSIZE)it  β9 (FLEV)it  β10 (FAGE)it  β11 
(CLUSTER)it  β12 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
Where, i is the company, t is the time and ↋ is the error term. 
Table 5.9. showed board size and gender diversity significant at 1%, audit 
committee composition at 5%, and board meeting at 10%. However, no significant 
relationship was found between board independence, CEO duality, board background 
and skill diversity, and intellectual capital resulting in the rejection of hypothesis H2d, 
H3d, and H6d. 
We reject H1d, where board size measured in terms of a board member is 
negatively associated with intellectual capital efficiency. It can be argued that the 
number of directors, not necessarily impact the intellectual capital of a firm, but it is the 
director who is independent matters to positively affect intellectual capital. The 
directors on the board may not be independent and are unable to bring resources, ideas, 
and knowledge to the board due to which they negatively affect intellectual capital 
efficiency. The argument is supported by Bhuiyan & Roudaki (2013) which showed 
that due to the presence of board interlocking, firms in New Zealand suffer to find a 
suitable independent expert director. Similarly, we accept hypothesis H4d, where audit 
115  
committee composition when measured in terms of the proportion of independent 
members positively affected intellectual capital efficiency. It is the independent director 
who is more likely to minimize shareholders’ exploitation by management and add 
value to the firm. They can effectively monitor and manage CEO behavior to improve 
intellectual capital efficiency (Chan & Li, 2008; Saibaba & Ansari, 2013; Collier, 
2001). 
We accept hypothesis H5d, where gender diversity also showed a positive 
association with intellectual capital. Female directors incorporate community issues 
within the organization’s development and growth, thus, broaden the scope of the 
board’s decision-making process. Female directors invest efficiently in intellectual 
capital that helps to maintain good external community relations compared to male 
directors improving the overall intellectual capital efficiency. Prior literature has also 
found a positive association (Kesner, 1988; Provan, 1980; Mitchell Williams, 2000; 
Terjesen et al., 2015). However, the result contradicts the study of Bilimoria & Piderit 
(1994) and Duppati et al. (2017). 
Finally, we accept hypothesis H7d, where board meetings showed a positive 
association with intellectual capital efficiency (Ntim & Osei, 2011; Francis, 2012). 
Board meetings provide advice and counseling which helps to formulate strategy/policy 
to enhance intellectual capital (Ntim & Osei, 2011). Also, it improves the innovative 
performance of the firm in the sense that it allows directors to handle uncertainties. 
Consequently, since innovation increases the stake of intangible and eases intellectual 
capital development, the intellectual capital performance increases.  
Comparing the result found in path analysis estimation (Table 5.7) and result 
found here (Table 5.9) no much difference is found, except the random regression 
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model showed a negative association between board size and intellectual capital while 
path analysis estimation showed a positive association. Thus, we answer the secondary 
research question number 2 by saying that there is a positive relationship between board 
structure (except board size) and intellectual capital based on the results found in Table 
5.7 and Table 5.9. 
 
 










































Adjusted 𝑅2 0.368 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and 




5.10.3. Board structure and cost of capital 
To choose the appropriate model, we run the Hausman test as shown in 
Appendix 6 and we rejected our null hypothesis. Thus, the below fixed effect model is 
used to examine board structure and cost of capital to achieve secondary research 
objective number 3: 
Cost of capital it = αit  β1 (BSIZE)it  β2 (BIND)it  β3 (CEOD)it  β4 
(AUDITC)it  β5 (GEND)it  β6 (BBS)it + β7 (BMEET)it + β8 (FSIZE)it  β9 (FLEV)it  
β10 (FAGE)it  β11 (CLUSTER)it  β12 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
 Where cost of capital = WACC, COE, COD, i is the company, t is the time and 
↋ is the error term. 
Fixed regression analysis (Table 5.10) shows that board size is negatively 
associated with WACC, COE, and COD but is significant only with COD at 5%; thus, 
hypothesis H1e is accepted. This can be interpreted from the resource dependency 
theory perspective that large board provides access to various resources which signals 
the stakeholder’s representation on board. A large board with qualified experience and 
knowledge increases communication with various stakeholders that helps to increase 
firm value, lower asymmetry of information, and reduce default risk. Thus, large boards 
help to reduce the cost of debt (Butt & Hasan, 2009; Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Lorca et al., 
2011; Hajjha et al., 2013). 
Agreeing with the study of Lorca et al. (2011) and Setiany et al. (2017) 
hypothesis H2e is rejected where no relationship is found between board independence 
and the cost of capital. However, board independence is insignificantly positively 
associated which can be interpreted that the independent directors lack a monitoring 
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mechanism that do not solve agency risk. Thus, they are unable to create value for 
creditors’ increasing the cost of capital. 
Hypothesis H3e is accepted where CEO duality showed a positive association 
with WACC at 10%. From an agency theory perspective, CEO duality holds greater 
power which affects board independence. CEO as chairperson can take decisions and 
control boards and meetings for personal interest (Boivie et al., 2011). Thus, 
organizational resources get diverted for personal interest where shareholder value does 
not get enhanced and the default risk increases forcing creditors to increase the rate of 
return. 
The audit committee composition is negatively associated with COD at 1% 
significance level (Anderson et al., 2004) where hypothesis H4e is accepted. A higher 
proportion of independent members in the audit committee provide credibility of 
financial statements to stakeholders. In addition, they increase the monitoring of 
financial discretion of management. Thus, a high proportion/number of independent 
members in the audit committee influences the financial process of the firm, reduces the 
default risk assuring stakeholders about good internal controls.  
In line with the study of Lucas-Perez et al., (2015), Gull et al., (2017), and 
Usman, Farooq, Zhang, Makki & Khan (2019), gender diversity showed negative 
association with COE and COD but was significant only with COD at 10%. Females on 
board avoid managers from earnings management, improve board independence, and 
reduce agency costs. As a result, information asymmetry reduces, and the assumption 
of loan default decreases which makes creditors ask for a lower rate of return. On the 
other hand, gender diversity is positively related at 1% with WACC. The discrepancy 
of the result between WACC and COD might be because of lack of agreement within 
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the board. Also, the incapability of females to respond to market shock makes the 
overall cost of capital to increase with female presence on board (Smith et al., 2005; 
Petrovic, 2008). However, due to reduced assumption of default loan by creditors and 
increased monitoring by female directors the cost of debt decreases. Thus, hypothesis 
H5e is accepted under the COD model and rejected under the WACC model. 
Similarly, we reject hypothesis H6e where no significant association is found 
between board background and skill diversity and cost of capital. Finally, hypothesis 
H7e is accepted where board meetings showed a negative association with WACC and 
COD at 1% and 5% significance level. From an agency theory perspective, 
management is monitored by the board which reduces agency cost. The effectiveness of 
the board increases when they meet regularly and show greater work diligence. As a 
monitoring mechanism, it is easier to get better governance by more board meetings to 
discuss issues (Vafeas, 1999). Thus, higher board meeting implies better monitoring 
mechanism, less information asymmetry with less agency problem and reduced cost of 
capital. 
Among control variables, firm size, and firm age are positively associated with 
WACC at 1% and 5%. It can be argued that large and old firms always tend to have 
more capital for growth opportunities. Thus, more and more acquisition of capital 
increases the firms’ risks, thereby the cost of capital increases. Similarly, firm leverage 
is positively significant with the cost of debt, where firms experiencing high debt will 
face financial risk which makes creditors demand a higher rate of return, increasing 
debt cost. Therefore, secondary research question number 3 can be answered by saying 
that there is a mixed association between board structure and cost of capital based on 
the results found in table 5.10. 
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Table 5. 10. Fixed effect regression analysis: board structure and cost of capital 




























































































R2 0.321 0.26 0.284 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.295 0.254 0.276 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  






5.10.4. Intellectual capital and firm performance 
To choose the appropriate model, we run the Hausman test as shown in 
Appendix 7 and we accepted our null hypothesis (random model is appropriate). The 
below random effect model is used to examine intellectual capital and firm performance 
to achieve secondary research objective number 4:  
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IC it = αit  β1 firm performance it  β2 (FSIZE)it  β3 (FLEV)it  β4 (FAGE)it + 
β5 (CLUSTER)it  β6 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
Where firm performance = ROA, ROE, TOBINQ, i is the company, t is the time 
and ↋ is the error term. 
In line with the study of Morariu (2014), this study found a negative association 
of intellectual capital with TOBINQ at 10% significance level (Table 5.11) leading to 
the rejection of hypothesis H8. This shows that even though firms are effective in 
monitoring and creating value from intellectual capital components, it is not appreciated 
by the investors in New Zealand. However, when we look at accounting-based 
measures, we partially accept hypothesis H8 where intellectual capital is positively 
related to ROA and ROE same as the study of Phusavat et al. (2011) and Alipour 
(2012) but is not significant. This indicates that whenever intellectual capital efficiency 
increases firms acquire and use their resources more efficiently which helps to generate 
profit and increase ROA and ROE. 
Among control variables firm age, firm leverage showed no relationship and 
firm size showed negative association at 1% under ROA, ROE, and TOBINQ, which is 
like the study of Hamdan et al., (2017). Assets might not be used at their best by large 
firms compared to small firms to create an appropriate return. This might be related to 
the internal environment factor of the organization. Therefore, based on table 5.11 we 
answer secondary research question number 4 by saying that there is an association 
between intellectual capital and firm performance where intellectual capital is 
positively related to accounting-based measure (ROA and ROE) and negatively related 
to market-based measure (TOBINQ). 
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Table 5. 11. Random effect regression analysis: intellectual capital and firm 
performance 


















































R2 0.421 0.278 0.333 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.384 0.255 0.301 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  





5.10.5. Intellectual capital and cost of capital 
To choose the appropriate model, we run the Hausman test as shown in 
Appendix 8 and we rejected our null hypothesis. Thus, the below fixed effect model is 
used to examine intellectual capital and cost of capital to achieve secondary research 
objective number 5: 
IC it = αit  β1 cost of capital it  β2 (FSIZE)it  β3 (FLEV)it  β4 (FAGE)it + β5 
(CLUSTER)it  β6 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
Where cost of capital = WACC, COE, COD, i is the company, t is the time and 
↋ is the error term. 
As shown in Table 5.12, intellectual capital showed strong a negative 
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association with WACC and COD (Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Boujelbene & Affes, 2013) 
leading to the acceptance of hypothesis H9. From the resource dependency theory 
perspective, with increased intellectual capital efficiency firms can acquire, manage 
resources at their best interest which lowers the required rate of return. Similarly, 
resource-based view theory argues that firms can use resources available inside the firm 
whether knowledge, skills, or external connection to acquire capital at a lower cost. 
Whenever intellectual capital disclosure is higher, lenders gain confidence, information 
asymmetry reduces, and demand for the rate of return decreases. However, this study 
measured intellectual capital using the VAIC model instead of focusing on disclosure. 
Among control variables, firm size, age, and leverage showed a positive and 
negative relationship with the cost of capital. Firm size was strongly negatively 
associated with WACC where large firms use their resources efficiently to acquire 
capital at a lower cost compared to smaller firms. Firm leverage showed a positive 
relationship with the cost of debt i.e., irrespective of intellectual capital efficiency firms 
with high debt face financial risk due to which creditors demand a higher rate of return.  
Comparing the result found in path analysis estimation (Table 5.7) and result 
found here (Table 5.12) no much difference is found, except under path analysis 
estimation. COD showed a positive association with intellectual capital while under the 
fixed effect model COD was negatively associated with intellectual capital. Thus, we 
answer the secondary research question number 5 by saying that there is a negative 
relationship between intellectual capital and cost of capital (except COD) based on the 




Table 5. 12. Fixed effect regression analysis: intellectual capital and cost of capital 


















































R2 0.482 0.29 0.366 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.461 0.261 0.332 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  





5.10.6. Cost of capital and firm performance 
To choose the appropriate model, we run the Hausman test as shown in 
Appendix 9 and we rejected our null hypothesis. Thus, the below fixed effect model is 
used to examine the cost of capital and firm performance to achieve secondary research 
objective number 6: 
Cost of capital it = αit  β1 firm performance it  β2 (FSIZE)it  β3 (FLEV)it  β4 
(FAGE)it + β5 (CLUSTER)it  β6 (INDSUTRY)it + ↋it 
Where cost of capital = WACC, COE, COD and firm performance = ROA, 
ROE, TOBINQ, i is the company, t is the time and ↋ is the error term. 
Table 5.13. revealed that WACC is positively associated with firm performance 
rejecting hypothesis H10 while COE and COD are negatively associated with firm 
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performance (Reverte, 2011; Pouraghajan et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2012) leading to the 
acceptance of hypothesis H10. When the weighted cost of capital increases, firm 
performance increases. It indicates that firms are risk seeker, where they acquire capital 
(debt and equity) at a higher rate and because high risk implies a higher return, higher 
WACC leads to higher performance. However, when looked at the source of capital 
separately, a negative association with firm performance is found. When firms acquire 
more of either only equity or debt, the financial risk increases, due to which cost of debt 
and equity increases and the firm performance decreases. Thus, the result shows that a 
balanced capital structure is necessary for effective firm performance. 
The control variable firm size showed a negative association for all the models 
of the cost of capital and performance. Petrova et al. (2012) examined corporate 
disclosure and capital cost for 121companies and found ROE to be less for larger firms. 
This implies that a large firm uses more capital inefficiently for growth opportunities 
which negatively affects performance compared to smaller firms. Also, firm leverage 
showed a positive relation with ROE at 10% significance level only under the COE 
model. This implies that when firms have high debt, shareholder’s equity reduces, and 
ROE increases. Finally, firm age and performance are not related. 
Comparing the result found in path analysis estimation (Table 5.7) and result 
found here (Table 5.13) no much difference is found, except under the fixed effect 
model, WACC showed a positive association with firm performance while under path 
analysis negative association with firm performance was found. Thus, we answer the 
secondary research question number 6 by saying that there is a negative relationship 
between the cost of capital (except WACC) and firm performance based on the results 
found in Table 5.7 and Table 5.13. 
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Table 5. 13. Fixed effect regression analysis: cost of capital and firm performance  


















































R2 0.776 0.753 0.291 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.734 0.742 0.267 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  Significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 


















































R2 0.849 0.7646 0.7641 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.80 0.732 0.715 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  





Table 5.13. Fixed effect regression analysis: cost of capital and firm performance – 
(Continued) 


















































R2 0.5705 0.4321 0.6630 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.5510 0.3842 0.6110 
t-value (P value in bracket). * , ** and ***  





























CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1. Summary 
This study examined the indirect relationship between board structure and firm 
performance with the mediating effect of intellectual capital and the cost of capital. 
Using theory triangulation (resource dependency theory, resource based-view theory, 
and agency theory), 10 hypotheses were formulated in the study. The study had three 
main objectives and six secondary objectives. Main objectives were to examine (1) the 
indirect relationship between board structure and firm performance with the mediating 
effect of intellectual capital (2) indirect relationship between board structure and firm 
performance with the mediating effect of cost of capital (3) the direct, indirect, and total 
effect of board structure on firm performance. Secondary objectives were to examine 
the direct relationship: (1) between board structure and firm performance (2) between 
board structure and intellectual capital (3) between board structure and cost of capital 
(4) between intellectual capital and firm performance (5) between intellectual capital 
and cost of capital (6) between the cost of capital and firm performance. Therefore, we 
focused on companies comprising of the NZX 50 index and ended up with a final 
sample of 391 observations for the period 2010-2019. 
To achieve the main objectives, the fixed regression model was used to examine 
the mediating effect of intellectual capital between board structure and firm 
performance where only board independence was found to be mediated by intellectual 
capital  (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Ho & Williams, 2003; Liu et al., 2015; Duchin et 
al; 2010). The result contradicted with the study of Nkundabanyanga (2014), 
Nkundabanyanga (2016), and Hamdan et al (2017) where intellectual capital did not 
mediate the relationship between board structure and firm performance except for board 
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independence. We argue the contradiction may be because of the high ownership 
concentration in New Zealand. This may lead to resources not managed efficiently and 
focused more towards the fulfillment of the opportunistic behavior of managers (Reddy 
et al., 2015). Thus, intellectual capital does not mediate the relationship between board 
structure and firm performance. 
On the other hand, the random regression model was used to examine the 
mediating effect of cost of capital between board structure and firm performance where 
board size, CEO duality, board background and skill diversity, and board meeting were 
found to be mediated negatively by the cost of capital under WACC, COE and COD 
models (Butt & Hasan, 2009; Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Hajjha et al., 2013; Lorca et al., 
2011). From an agency theory perspective, it is argued that due to the ineffective 
monitoring mechanism, cost of capital negatively mediates between board size, CEO 
duality, board background and skill diversity and board meeting, and firm performance. 
Besides, board independence, gender diversity, and audit committee composition were 
found to be mediated positively by the cost of capital under WACC, COE and COD 
models (Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam, 2012). This result supports the prior literature 
arguments where independent directors and females were found to be highly influential 
factors for creditors to demand a lower rate of return (Piot & Missonier-Piera, 2007). 
The findings fill the gap in the literature to understand that not only intellectual capital 
but also the cost of capital mediates the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance. 
Finally, to check if both the variables i.e., intellectual capital and cost of capital 
mediate the relationship between board structure and firm performance we used the 
path analysis postestimation tool in Stata. It was revealed that the indirect effect of 
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board structure (except gender diversity) on firm performance is enhanced in a better 
way through intellectual capital and cost of capital compared to the direct effect of 
board structure on firm performance and the separate mediation effect of intellectual 
capital and cost of capital. Thus, the findings fill the gap in the literature by 
contributing that intellectual capital and cost of capital together mediates the 
relationship between board structure and firm performance. A good board structure 
enhances intellectual capital efficiency through which lower cost of capital can be 
obtained implying higher firm performance. 
To achieve the secondary objectives, we first run the estimation tool for the path 
analysis model which helped to achieve secondary objectives 1,2,5, and 6. Further 
additional tests were made to re-confirm the results found in the path analysis model for 
secondary objectives 1,2,5, and 6 and to achieve secondary objectives 3 and 4. 
Secondary objective (1) revealed the positive association of board independence and 
audit committee composition with firm performance (Dey, 2008; Saibaba & Ansari, 
2013; Liu et al., 2015) and negative association of board meeting with firm 
performance (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Ilaboya and Obaretin, 2015). Secondary 
objective (2) revealed the negative association of board size with intellectual capital 
(Donnelly & Kelly, 2005; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005) and positive association of audit 
committee composition, gender diversity and board meeting with intellectual capital 
(Chan & Li, 2008; Garcia-Ramos, 2011; Terjesen et al.,2015; Christiansen et al., 2016). 
Secondary objective (3) revealed the negative association of board size, audit 
committee composition, gender diversity and board meeting with the cost of debt (Butt 
& Hasan, 2009; Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Hajjha et al., 2013; Lorca et al., 2011) and 
positive association of gender diversity with WACC (Smith et al., 2005; Petrovic, 
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2008). Secondary objective (4) revealed a negative association of intellectual capital 
with TOBINQ (Huang and Liu, 2005; Morariu, 2014). Secondary objective (5) revealed 
a negative association of WACC and the cost of debt with intellectual capital (Botosan 
& Plumlee, 2002; Orens et al., 2010). Finally, secondary objective (6) revealed WACC 
to be positively associated with firm performance and cost of debt and equity to be 
negatively associated with firm performance (Reverte, 2011; Wu et al., 2012; 
Pouraghajan et al., 2012). The findings of secondary research objectives validate the 
prior literature and fill the gap in the literature for the context of New Zealand where no 
research was found to be conducted in New Zealand regarding the relationship between 
board structure - intellectual capital, board structure - cost of capital, intellectual capital 
- cost of capital, intellectual capital - firm performance and cost of capital - firm 
performance. 
6.2. Contribution and implication 
Based on the results found, academicians, practitioners and society can be 
benefitted from this study. From a managerial perspective, the company board, 
management would use this finding as a guideline to know how to improve firm 
performance and what to focus on within the board structure to enhance intellectual 
capital. Although directors are emphasized by the Companies Act 1993 and other 
corporate governance codes, board structure should not divorce itself from intellectual 
capital. Board of directors should try to enhance intellectual capital because it will help 
the firm to get capital at less cost thereby improve firm performance which is beneficial 
to all stakeholders. Also, from a practical implication perspective, this study findings 
can help policymakers and the stock market to decide on how to set corporate 
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governance principles or codes that can help firms to enhance firm performance 
focusing on intellectual capital. Especially, in New Zealand where ownership 
concentration is very high and market capitalization low, it becomes difficult for 
intellectual capital to be utilized or managed efficiently and effectively due to the 
owners influence and control over management. Since the finding of the results showed 
intellectual capital mediates positively between board structure and firm performance 
and lowers the cost of capital, the study guides practitioners in New Zealand on 
developing principles/codes on the importance of intellectual capital and encouraging 
dispersed ownership. 
On the academic front, this study shows a sign of matured discipline to 
incorporate mediating variables i.e., intellectual capital and cost of capital to examine 
board structure and firm performance association for a meaningful conclusion. A 
relational study without a mediating mechanism provides an incomplete understanding. 
Therefore, the incorporation of mediating variables should not be underestimated if 
more explanation for an outcome is needed. Also, this study adds value to the literature 
by joining two separate streams of literature into one as no study has examined the cost 
of capital among board structure, intellectual capital, and firm performance variables. 
Thus, the development of a model incorporating four variables and showing the 
mediation effect through two variables is a major contribution of this study. Finally, the 
study adds to the literature in understanding the link between intellectual capital and 




6.3. Limitation and future research 
Although this study has made various contributions, some limitation still exists. 
First, we have focused only on the top 50 companies which comprise the NZX index 
which may limit the generalizability of the study as other companies listed on the New 
Zealand stock exchange are not considered. Second, not many control variables are 
used in the regression analysis. Third, intellectual capital would have been calculated 
using the latest method of calculation i.e., MVAIC, however reasons for calculating 
intellectual capital via VAIC are justified in chapter 4. Finally, the study has used 
different techniques such as path analysis model, path model estimation, fixed/random 
effect regression to answer main and secondary research objectives. The mixed result 
between path model estimation and fixed/random effect regression may have impacted 
the robustness findings of the study.  
Future research may test the path analysis model developed in this study in 
other economies and compare the results. Also, instead of a path analysis model, the 
SEM model i.e., Structured Equation Modelling including latent variables or 3SLS can 
be used as a methodology to examine the relationship between board structure, 
intellectual capital, cost of capital, and firm performance. The different methodologies 
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Appendix 1: Normality test 
 
Variable Obs Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2 (2) Prob>chi2 
BSIZE 410 0.0000 0.0000 60.5900 0.0000 
BIND 410 0.0946 0.2971 3.8900 0.1429 
CEOD 410 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
AUDITC 410 0.0246 0.7474 5.1600 0.0756 
GEND 410 0.0000 0.5861 7.0700 0.0292 
BBS 410 0.0000 0.7227 18.4300 0.0001 
BMEET 410 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
IC 410 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
WACC 410 0.0000 0.0163 50.9700 0.0000 
COE 410 0.0000 0.5643 3.8900 0.0000 
COD 410 0.6476 0.0433 4.3000 0.1163 
ROA 410 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
ROE 410 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
TOBINQ 410 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
FSIZE 410 0.7567 0.0567 . 0.0671 
FLEV 410 0.0000 0.0167 17.1000 0.0002 
FAGE 410 0.0000 0.6249 39.0600 0.0000 
CLUSTER 410 0.9529 0.0000 . 0.0000 
























Appendix 2: Hausman test (Board structure and firm performance {ROA, ROE, 











BSIZE 0.0878838 0.0110048 0.076879 . 
BIND 0.0313456 0.0231818 0.0081638 0.0019225 
CEOD -0.1689475 
-






GEND 0.0024444 0.0249432 
-
0.0224988 0.0122684 
BBS 0.0171287 0.0187934 -1.66E-03 0.0022049 
BMEET 0.0440528 0.0626214 -1.86E-02 0.0196176 
BSIZE_IC 0.0636862 0.0596282 0.0040581 . 
BIND_IC -0.0006223 0.0008826 
-
0.0015049 0.0004809 
CEOD_IC 0.134669 0.1021905 0.0324785 0.0154926 
AUDITC_IC -0.0023513 -0.002373 0.0000217 . 




BMEET_IC -0.0044162 -0.005593 0.0011768 . 
FSIZE -3.333187 -3.212545 -
0.1206423 
. 
FLEV 0.013088 0.0104043 0.0026837 . 
FAGE 0.5321914 0.5547608 
-
0.0225694 . 
CLUSTER 0.0040937 0.0000566 0.004037 . 
INDUSTRY 0.0002942 0.0002625 0.0000317 5.62E-06 
  chi2(18) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       14.05 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.032 
 
Note: for all the models the p-value was less than 0.05. Thus, fixed effect is used for all 







Appendix 3:  Hausman test (Board structure and firm performance {ROA, ROE, 
TOBINQ} with mediating effect of cost of capital {WACC, COE, COD}) 
 
 
Note: for all the models the p-value was greater than 0.05. Thus, random effect is used 





















CEOD -3.461552 -4.579491 1.117938 0.1692082 
AUDITC -0.078147 
-
0.1002276 0.0220806 0.0068202 
GEND 0.004206 
-
0.0100796 0.0142857 0.0254232 
BBS 0.0263821 0.041505 -1.51E-02 0.0046119 
BMEET 0.329717 0.443185 -1.13E-01 0.0581119 
BSIZE_WACC -0.1346339 
-
0.1409095 0.0062756 0.0057751 
BIND_WACC 0.0167436 0.015228 0.0015156 0.0007621 
CEOD_WACC 0.2868024 0.3873234 -0.100521 0.001531 
AUDITC_WACC 0.0043435 0.0068956 
-
0.0025521 0.0008666 




BMEET_WACC -0.036628 -0.055713 0.0190851 0.0065286 
FSIZE -3.075036 -3.065784 -
0.0092515 
0.0698728 
FLEV 0.0112577 0.0103683 0.0008894 . 





0.0059743 0.0059123 0.001774 
INDUSTRY 0.0002278 0.0001851 0.0000427 1.03E-05 
chi2(18) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       12.80 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8035 
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BSIZE 0.4036135 0.3028832 0.1007302 0.021561 
BIND 0.0247659 0.0243117 0.0004542 0.0022438 
CEOD -0.1285724 -0.5137101 0.3851376 0.1613387 
AUDITC -0.0417584 -0.0433817 0.0016233 . 
GEND 0.0073794 0.0205819 -0.0132025 0.0100298 
BBS 0.0095508 0.0060277 0.0035231 0.0017696 
BMEET 0.0626397 0.0575901 0.0050496 0.0200562 
FSIZE -3.509101 -3.375887 
-0.1332134 
0.0156166 
FLEV 0.0063121 0.0047022 0.0016099 . 
FAGE 0.5393841 0.5592643 -0.0198802 . 
CLUSTER 0.0009645 -0.0016707 0.0026352 . 
INDUSTRY 0.0003055 0.0002788 0.0000266 6.47E-06 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       60.07 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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BSIZE 0.6924882 0.8804832 -0.187995 . 
BIND 0.0114912 0.0131225 
-
0.0016312 . 








GEND 0.0748702 0.0530095 0.0218607 . 






FSIZE -2.939213 -3.176329 0.2371158 0.0408811 
FLEV 0.011526 0.01495 
-
0.0034239 0.0024999 
FAGE 0.7235837 0.6860013 0.0375824 0.0965186 
CLUSTER 0.0018135 0.006884 
-
0.0050705 0.0053224 
INDUSTRY 0.0010694 0.001113 
-
0.0000436 1.00E-05 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       87.20 






























BSIZE 0.6924882 0.0644088 0.6280793 0.3921566 






AUDITC -0.0672225 0.0026492 
-
0.0698716 0.0343772 
GEND 0.0748702 0.00205 0.0728202 0.0398406 
BBS 0.0039411 -0.004349 0.0082901 0.0265194 
BMEET -0.0128445 -0.044873 0.0320285 0.1640283 
FSIZE -2.939213 -0.565222 -2.373991 0.8929589 
FLEV 0.011526 
-
0.0002509 0.011777 0.0245926 
FAGE 0.7235837 0.0659165 0.6576672 0.7946651 
CLUSTER 0.0018135 
-
0.0101361 0.0119496 0.0479151 
INDUSTRY 0.0010694 
-
0.0000519 0.0011212 2.81E-04 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       20.47 







































CEOD 0.9333974 0.9213125 0.0120849 0.5463622 





0.1165795 0.0098313 0.0216709 
BBS 0.0078186 0.0073628 0.0004558 0.0056671 
BMEET 0.2973572 0.3040577 
-
0.0067004 0.049275 
FSIZE 0.3757185 0.3744933 0.0012252 0.1495781 













0.0010213 -7.34E-06 4.78E-05 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        1.38 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9997 
 
Breusch and Pegan LM Test: 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =     70.86 








































































BSIZE 0.1028772 0.1912036 
-
0.0883264 . 
BIND 0.0123199 0.0021066 0.0102133 . 
CEOD 0.5544284 1.105978 
-
0.5515496 . 





0.0013451 0.0414255 . 








FSIZE -1.05412 -1.234599 0.1804788 . 
FLEV 0.0001483 0.0025146 
-
0.0023663 . 






INDUSTRY -0.0000527 0.000019 -7.17E-05 . 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =     1058.92 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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BSIZE 0.1579002 0.0316637 0.1262364 0.0601829 
BIND -0.0080678 0.0046964 
-
0.0127642 0.0052992 
CEOD 0.7714584 -0.044987 0.8164454 0.4060037 
AUDITC 0.0125123 0.0066341 0.0058782 0.0053211 





0.0061798 0.005329 0.0040542 
BMEET 0.0350975 
-
0.0805971 0.1156945 0.0243551 
FSIZE 0.5277631 0.775936 
-
0.2481729 0.1380333 
FLEV 0.0079548 0.0047052 0.0032495 0.0038244 
FAGE 0.1558091 0.171415 -0.015606 0.1239716 
CLUSTER -0.0119589 
-
0.0178978 0.0059389 0.007462 
INDUSTRY 0.0000862 
-
0.0000119 9.81E-05 0.0000434 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =     397.14 






































0.0059176 0.0060991 . 










0.0298663 0.0217795 . 
BBS 0.0038161 0.0061231 
-
0.0023069 . 
BMEET 0.0426436 0.091579 
-
0.0489354 . 
FSIZE -0.0967826 -0.200211 0.1034284 . 





0.0591552 0.0024984 . 
CLUSTER -0.0016099 0.0004553 
-
0.0020653 . 
INDUSTRY -0.0000362 2.99E-06 -3.92E-05 . 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =     659.03 





























0.0047249 0.0224577 0.0206967 
FSIZE -0.394409 
-
















0.0012018 -6.02E-06 0.0000194 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        3.43 































0.0575075 0.0113 0.0116433 
FSIZE -0.548035 
-






FAGE -0.5886545 -0.593449 0.0047945 0.0634735 
CLUSTER -0.0538835 
-






chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        2.82 




Appendix 7: Hausman test (Intellectual capital and firm performance {ROA, ROE, 












     TOBINQ -1.231433 -1.392318 0.1608845 0.1197041 
















0.0012603 7.98E-06 0.0000245 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        2.44 





































0.4529516 -0.316366 0.1377151 
















INDUSTRY -0.0012103 -0.001206 -4.27E-06 . 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       13.89 




























































0.0011887 1.66E-05 . 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        9.91 





Appendix 8: Hausman test (Intellectual capital and cost of capital {WACC, COE, 



















































































0.0011512 2.17E-05 . 
chi2(5) = (b B)'[(V_b-V_B)^( 1)](b-B) 
= 6.73 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0245 
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Appendix 9: Hausman test (Cost of capital {WACC, COE, COD} and firm 





















FLEV 0.0008114 0.0002078 0.0006036 0.0011666 







0.0165516 -0.000642 0.0022166 
INDUSTRY 
-
0.0000171 -0.000019 1.89E-06 0.0000132 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        3.40 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.043 
 
Note: for all the models the p-value was less than 0.05. Thus, fixed effect is used for all 
above mentioned models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
